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Japan’s “Resentful Realism” and Balancing China’s Rise 
Christopher W. Hughes 
University of Warwick 
Abstract 
Japan has been regarded by all mainstream International Relations theories as a status quo power intent 
on pursuing an immobilist international strategy toward China characterized by hedging rather than any 
move to active balancing. This paper challenges these assumptions and asks whether Japan will, or 
indeed already is, moving toward active balancing. The paper does so by reinterpreting the very 
assumptions of those theoretical perspectives that predict only hedging and by drawing on fresh empirical 
evidence. It argues that the conditions that are thought to encourage hedging behavior—the predictability 
of other states’ intentions, the malleability of intentions through engagement, domestic preferences that 
obviate balancing, and a favorable offense-defense balance—are now deteriorating in the case of Japan’s 
strategy toward China. Japanese policy-makers over the last decade have experienced an accelerated 
decline in their confidence to read China’s intentions and to mold these, to the point that China is now 
regarded as an increasingly malign actor. Japan’s own domestic regime change, paralleling that of China, 
has released Revisionist forces that favor the cessation of the “underbalancing” of China. Very 
significantly, Japanese policy-makers’ faith is eroding in the ability to maintain defensive superiority 
over China, either through its own internal capabilities or the U.S.-Japan alliance. The consequence is 
that the evidence is now mounting of Japan shifting toward active “soft” and incipient “hard” balancing 
of China through a policy of the active “encirclement” of China diplomatically, the build-up of Japanese 
national military capabilities aimed to counter China’s access denial and power projection, and the 
strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. This shift has become particularly evident following the 2010 
trawler incident and the return to power of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō in 2012. The consequences of 
Japan’s shifting strategy are yet as not entirely clear. Japan may be moving toward a form of “Resentful 
Realism” that does not add to a new equilibrium to regional security but is actually more destabilizing 
and poses risk for China and the U.S., especially as Japan’s own security intentions become more opaque. 
In turn, these conclusions invite a reconsideration of the comfortable theoretical consensus on Japan as 
an eternal status quo power, and encourage Constructivism, Neoliberalism, but especially Neorealism, 
to be bolder in their assertions about the probability and degree of radicalism in Japan’s security 
trajectory. 
 
Japan as an Incipient Balancer vis-à-vis China’s Rise? 
Might Japan’s international strategy shift radically, or indeed is it already beginning to 
shift radically, in response to China’s rise? How might such a shift impact long-term 
on Sino-Japanese security relations and U.S.-led attempts to “rebalance” the regional 
security order? Might Japanese “Revisionist” governments even actively and overtly 
balance against China? Japan clearly maintains a fundamental interest in the rise of 
China, possible associated disturbances in the overall international system and East 
Asian regional order, and most especially the prospect of U.S. unipolarity being 
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displaced by a new multipolarity, or even China eventually challenging for its own 
hegemonic dominance.1  
 
Japan’s vital interest in these developments is, of course, intensified all the further by 
its close geographical proximity to China and interdependence of political, economic 
and security interests; and by its position in the post-war period as essentially a “status 
quo” power supportive of the continuation of U.S.-led international order and bound to 
the U.S. through an increasingly deepening alliance relationship. The expectation 
should be that any shifts in the U.S.-led international and regional systems in which 
Japan has been so firmly embedded, and as precipitated by China, should pose 
questions about the precipitation of a similar counter-reaction from Japan. The more 
radical the impact of China on the regional order, then the more proportionately radical 
Japan’s response might be. Japan may choose to channel its response via the U.S.-Japan 
alliance and this may bolster the U.S. security presence in the Asia-Pacific. 
Alternatively, if Chinese hegemony is truly perceived as on the cards, then this might 
be considered as necessitating Japan to initiate a counter-hegemonic strategy in 
conjunction with or separate from the U.S.—all with potential ramifications for stability 
as the two largest East Asian states contend over the shape of the regional security 
order.  
 
Thus far, however, Japan’s reaction to China’s rise has been regarded—so the public 
argument goes for the majority of Japanese and U.S. policy-makers and 
                                                        
1 For an excellent overview of the arguments on China’s rise and the prospects for the displacement of 
U.S. hegemony, see Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising 
Power (New York: Norton and Company, 2015), pp. 63-94.  
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commentators—to be highly restrained and to demonstrate no fundamental change in 
Japanese international strategy. 2  Japanese policy-makers, such as current Prime 
Minister Abe Shinzō, even as they work to revise national security strategies and 
military capabilities to guard against China’s rise—the Abe government most notably 
in September 2015 passing extensive legislation to overturn the sixty year old-ban on 
the exercise of collective self-defense to expand the range of military support for the 
US-Japan alliance—utilize language to describe strategy, such as a “Proactive 
Contribution to Peace” (sekkyoku-teki heiwashugi), in order to stress essential 
continuity with the demilitarized post-war past rather than change.  
 
Abe in National Diet policy speeches has argued that “the peaceful rise of China offers 
a great opportunity for Japan as well as for the international community. Under the 
principle of a ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests’ 
                                                        
2  Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China Since 1989: From Balancing to 
Bandwagoning? (London: Routledge, 2003); Mike M. Mochizuki, ‘China-Japan Relations: Downward 
Spiral or a New Equilibrium?’, in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 135-150; David C. Kang, China Rising: 
Peace, Power and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 154-182, 199; 
James Manicom and Andrew O’Neil, ‘Sino-Japanese Strategic Relations: Will Rivalry Lead to 
Confrontation?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 2, 2009, pp. 213-232; 
Yoshihide Soeya, ‘A “Normal” Middle Power: Interpreting Changes in Japanese Security Policy in the 
1990s and After’, in Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadakoro, and David A. Welch, eds., Japan As A 
‘Normal’ Country? A Nation in Search of its Place in the World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2011), pp. 72-97; Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for 
Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2011), pp. 211-213; Linus Hagström, 
‘Rethinking Japan’s China Policy: Japan as an Accommodator in the Rise of China, 1978-2011’, Journal 
of East Asian Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2012, pp. 215-250. 
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(senryaku-teki gokei kankei), we will further strengthen the trend of improving 
relations”.3 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) maintains the official position 
that, despite various bilateral “differences” over especially territory and maritime 
security, “Stable Japan-China relations are essential not only to the citizens of both 
countries, but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region as  whole. 
Accordingly, based on the concept of the ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on 
Common Strategic Interests’, the Government of Japan will promote the development 
of Japan-China relations from a broad perspective through continued dialogues and 
cooperation at various levels”.4 Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2013 
stressed that even in response to perceived attempts by China to change the status quo 
by coercion in the East and South China Seas, “Japan will urge China to exercise self-
restraint and will continue to respond firmly but in a calm manner without escalation”, 
so claiming that it would not be the power to break the status quo.5 Meanwhile, U.S.-
Japan alliance managers and insiders flatly repeat the mantra that Japan remains a 
disciplined partner in any hedging strategy toward China.6 
 
                                                        
3 Prime Minister of Japan, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 190th Session of the Diet’, 
January 22, 2016, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201601/1215627_10999.html. 
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 2015 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Japan, 2015), p. 52. 
5  Cabinet Office Japan, National Security Strategy, December 17, 2013, 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, p. 25. 
6 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, The US-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., August 2012, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/120810_Armitage_USJapanAlliance_Web.pdf, pp. 8-10. 
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From the perspective of Neorealism, many analysts agree that Japan as yet has failed 
to react to the changing international structure and to display either significant 
balancing, or less probable bandwagoning behavior, vis-à-vis China’s rise. Japan’s 
apparent lack of a balancing impulse appears to defy the conventional Neorealist 
predictions of state behavior and to continue to fulfill its characterization as a 
“structural anomaly”.7 In the absence of a compelling Neorealist analysis, in recent 
years much of the explanation of Japan’s international relations has lapsed into 
Constructivist perspectives, which have stressed the primacy of deep-rooted domestic 
anti-militaristic norms and principles over international structural pressures.8 For the 
Constructivist take on Japan, therefore, the emphasis has been on continuity and stasis 
in Japan’s international strategy, even to the point that its security policy has been 
claimed as akin to an “immovable object”. 9  Meanwhile, although Neoliberal 
Institutionalism has been more marginal as a distinct perspective applied to Japan, 
especially given the dominance of Constructivism and its “positive” norms of anti-
militarism that offer crossover with key tenets of Liberalism-type outcomes, it too has 
                                                        
7 Kenneth A. Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security, Vol. 18, 
No. 2, 1993, pp. 44-79. 
8 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, ‘Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies’, 
International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1993, pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: 
National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); 
Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2008).  
9 Richard H. Friman, Peter J. Katzenstein, David Leheny, and Nobuo Okawara, ‘Immovable Object? 
Japan’s Security Policy in East Asia’, in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, eds., Beyond Japan: 
The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 85-
107. 
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emphasized continuity in Japanese international strategy, or “Cautious Liberalism”, 
marked again by a lack of impulse to pursue balancing.10  
 
In the midst of this Constructivist stranglehold on the study of Japan’s international and 
security orientation, the best traction that Neorealism and its variants has been able to 
gain on the debate has been to introduce explanations that essentially corroborate the 
consensus on Japan’s lack of propensity to diverge from its post-war security stance 
and to avoid active balancing. Japan has been evaluated as pursuing various “Realist”-
oriented strategies to respond to China’s rise, such as a Japanese-specific variant of 
“Defensive Realism”, which sees Japan concentrating on “homeland defense” through 
the acquisition of “defensive” weaponry and the eschewing of broader international 
security objectives outside its own territory that would involve influencing the balance 
of power.11 Japan has also been categorized as pursuing a “buck-passing” strategy and 
essentially passive reliance on the U.S. to cope with China’s rise.12  
 
More prevalently, Japan has been viewed as moving toward a strategy of “Reluctant 
Realism”, with a gradualistic propensity to work with its U.S. ally to meet common 
                                                        
10 Thomas U. Berger, ‘Japan’s International Relations: The Political and Security Dimensions’, in Samuel 
S. Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 
pp. 101-134. 
11  Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).  
12  Jennifer Lind, ‘Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy’, 
International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2004, pp. 92-121. 
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security challenges.13 “Reluctant Realism” is perhaps the view that edges closest to 
suggesting Japan might look cautiously to balance China, but in all these variants of 
Neorealism/Realism, Japan is regarded as largely passive in seeking to respond to 
China’s rise, and only likely to balance via the mechanism of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
and never individually. In fact, most Neorealist/Realist views settle on the argument 
that at the very most Japan is set to hedge rather than balance against China’s rise, or 
in one important formulation: “cooperative engagement with a soft hedge”.14   
 
The somewhat curious implicit consensus amongst the supposedly contending 
perspectives of Neorealism, Constructivism and Liberalism that Japan has been, 
continues to be, and likely will remain, highly restrained in responding to China’s rise 
might seem to render redundant any further discussion of a possibly more radical 
Japanese reaction, including the impulse to more actively balance. Japan’s “Yoshida 
Doctrine”—classically formulated as a concentration on economic engagement, an 
“exclusively defense-oriented” security posture, and reliance on the shield of U.S. 
                                                        
13 Michael Jonathan Green, ‘Managing Chinese Power: The View from Japan’, in Alastair Iain Johnson 
and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 
1999), pp. 159-172; Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era 
of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
14 Mike M. Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Shifting Strategy Toward the Rise of China’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4-5, 2007, pp. 739-776; Evelyn Goh, ‘How Japan Matters in the Evolving East 
Asian Security Order’, International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4, 2011, pp. 895-896; Michael J. Green, ‘Japan, 
India and the Strategic Triangle with China’, in Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner and Jessica Keough, eds., 
Strategic Asia 2011-12: Asia Responds to its Rising Powers (Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of 
Asian Research, 2011), pp. 131-159. 
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hegemony—would appear to be a highly entrenched grand strategy for Japanese policy-
makers.15  
 
But in spite of the need to recognize the inevitable continuities and inertia in the pursuit 
of any grand strategy, alternative analyses have in recent years pointed to the signs that 
Japan is capable of, and is actually embarking on, a trajectory of radical change in its 
international strategy, even if this is occurring in such incremental steps as to be almost 
imperceptible at times to those paradigms that tend to search for more dramatic shifts. 
Japan’s ever-growing flirtation since the early 2000s with “Revisionist” Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) regimes, and to boot a brief-lived Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) regime, with strong emphases on national defense reform and breaching past 
anti-militaristic principles to achieve a “normal” security role (or, more 
straightforwardly put, remilitarization of security policy) coupled with ever-
intensifying and seemingly intractable security frictions with China, obliges even the 
most diehard of Constructivists and Liberals to take stock of whether their status quo 
perspectives can still be reconciled with these increasingly dynamic and long-term 
developments. 16  Most particularly, the advent since 2012 of Abe Shinzō’s arch-
revisionist LDP administration and its systematic dismantlement of the post-war 
                                                        
15  Sun-Ki Chai, ‘Entrenching the Yoshida Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization’, 
International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1997, pp. 389-412; Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli’s 
Children: Leaders and their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
2003), pp. 200-211. 
16  Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Reemergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (London: Routledge, 2009); 
Jeffrey Hornung, ‘With a Left Like This, Who Needs the Right?’, Japan Chair Platform, February 11, 
2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/110211_Hornung.pdf. 
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constraints on Japan’s exercise of military power—including the 2015 breach on ban 
on the exercise of collective self-defense, in large part in direct reaction to Sino-
Japanese tensions over the disputes Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and maritime security—
indicates a Japanese propensity to search for a new grand strategy, including the turning 
point of an incipient shift to balancing behavior against China.  
 
In turn, even if Constructivism and Liberalism have been slow to recognize and account 
for these developments, the changing security dynamics within and surrounding Japan 
have opened up space for Neorealist analysis to consider whether its estimations of a 
restrained Japanese response to China’s rise also remain accurate, and if a shift to 
balancing might be increasingly apropos to this perspective’s basic assumptions about 
state behavior in a more fluid international system. Neorealist-oriented analyses have 
thus recently begun to appear which venture to argue that Japan is inching toward 
balancing against the rise of China.17 Nonetheless, it is perhaps fair to say that these 
analyses remain on the margins of the debate and are as yet to decisively challenge the 
                                                        
17 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘China’s Unpeaceful Rise’, Current History, Vol. 105, No. 690, 2006, pp. 160-
162; Robert S. Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing 
in East Asia’, Security Studies, vo. 13, no. 3, 2010, pp. 387-389; Jae Ho Chung, ‘East Asia Responds to 
the Rise of China: Patterns and Variations’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2, 2009, pp. 657-675; Derek 
McDougall, ‘Responses to “Rising China” in the East Asia Region: Soft balancing with Accommodation’, 
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 21, No. 73, 2012, pp. 8-9; Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning, ‘Japan’s 
Shifting Military Priorities: Counterbalancing China’s Rise’, Asian Security, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2014, pp. 1-
21; Jeffrey W. Hornung, ‘Japan’s Growing Hard Hedge Against China’, Asian Security, Vol. 10, No. 2, 
2014, pp. 97-122; Jeffrey W. Hornung, ‘Japan’s Pushback of China’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 38, 
No. 1, 2015, pp. 167-183.  
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mainstream Neorealism-Constructivism-Liberalism consensus on Japan’s lack of 
propensity to balance China.  
 
They are perhaps hampered in this effort by the tendency to observe the first symptoms 
of balancing behavior in terms of the build-up of diplomatic and military activities and 
capabilities but then are less able to follow through with focus and precision on 
explaining why and when this behavior may actually occur, so depriving their analysis 
of the necessary theoretical and empirical impetus to overturn the default status quo 
view that very much focuses on why change is improbable. The result is that, despite 
there being pressing theoretical and empirical indicators suggesting the necessity, 
avenues for investigation, and the feasibility of such an exercise, there are still no 
sustained attempts in much of the Japan-centred debate to break down the consensus 
over the essential immutability of Japan’s international strategy and the apparent refusal 
to consider that it is shifting to balance China.18  
 
The consequent objective of this article is to pick up on these emergent arguments that 
test the current consensus and to engage squarely in an attempt to determine the 
likelihood of Japan shifting to balance against China, the consequences for Sino-
                                                        
18 Japan’s shift to balance China has, though, been observed in Chinese academic literature. For exmaples 
of recent analysis that argue Japan is beginning to competer against, balance and even contain China, 
see:  Miao Ji and Li Fujian, ‘Strategic Vigliance and Adaptation: Japan’s and Australia’s Responses to 
the Rise of China’, Foreign Affairs Review, No. 1, 2014, pp. 70-89; Wang Shan, ‘Shipingxi Anbei 
Zhengquan “Baituo Zhanhou Tizhi” De Waijiao Jucuo’ (A Preliminary Review of the Abe 
Administration’s Diplomatic Initiatives to ‘Escape the Postwar Regime’), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 
(Contemporary International Relations), No. 9, 2013, pp, 39-43; Zhu Haiyan, ‘Riao Guanxi 
“Tongmenghua” De Xinfazhan Jiqi Qianjing’ (New Developments and the Prospect of ‘Alliance 
Orientation’ in Japan-Australia Relations), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International 
Relations), No. 8, 2014, pp. 44-51; Chen Xin, ‘Qianxi Anbei “Zhanlue Waijiao”’ (A Brief Analysis of 
Abe’s ‘Strategic Diplomacy’), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), No. 9, 
2014, pp. 15-22; Yang Guanghai, ‘Riben Jieru Nanhai Zhengduan De Xindongxiang Ji Xintedian’ (New 
Directions and Features of Japan’s Intervention in the South China Sea Dispute), Heping yu Fazhan 
(Peace and Development), No. 5, 2015, pp. 96-113; Shi Yongming, ‘Cong Diqu Zhixu Goujian Kan 
Riben de Xin Anbao Faan’ (Examining Japan’s New Security Legislation from the Perspective of 
Regional Order Building), Heping yu Fazhan (Peace and Development), No. 6, 2015, pp. 1-14.  
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Japanese relations, for Japan’s overall international strategy and for East Asian security 
more widely. The article asks whether it is now possible to credibly envisage, or indeed 
already observe, a shift from a restrained hedging stance to one more approximating to 
soft-balancing and incipient “hard balancing”. More specifically, the article asks, by 
revisiting much of the theoretical analysis concerning Japan to date, and in noting the 
difficulty of challenging the consensus without greater precision on explaining how 
deviation from the status quo will occur, whether it can be discerned under exactly what 
conditions and when Japan is likely to shift, or is already shifting, toward active 
balancing.  
 
The paper undertakes this project by considering four sets of key conditions found in 
extant theory that indicate when a state which has traditionally not pursued balancing 
behavior then begins to turn to this strategy. These are found in varieties of Neorealism, 
Neoclassical Realism and to some extent Liberalism, and are, namely: the ability of 
states to read accurately or otherwise the benign or malign strategic intentions of states 
that they may then need to balance against; the faith of states in their capacity to mold 
the intentions of other states in a benign direction; assessments about the changing 
distribution of offensive versus defensive capabilities that might induce balancing 
behavior; and the transformation of the domestic policy-making process away from past 
tendencies for “underbalancing”.19 
 
This reinvestigation of the existing orthodoxy on Japan’s restrained and hedging stance 
toward China, and the concomitant propensity for Japanese balancing behavior is 
                                                        
19 Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).  
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important in two main ways. First, determining if Japan is likely to move toward 
balancing, and under what conditions and when, has significant policy implications for 
regional security. It may reveal the likely intensity of any Japanese balancing behavior, 
and the impact on Sino-Japanese security relations, as well as on U.S. security strategy 
in the region and the evolution of the overall regional security order. Japan’s 
repurposing of its strategy toward China and subsequent own potential balancing 
strategy raises questions for the degree of its conformity with the current U.S. 
“rebalance” strategy toward the Asia-Pacific. Conversely, in looking to discover the 
underlying conditions that might precipitate Japanese balancing of China, this 
investigation should reveal the causes of bilateral tensions and how these might be 
mitigated or even averted. 
 
Second, an attempt to investigate Japan’s propensity for change, characterized by 
incipient balancing behavior, produces an important contribution to the theoretical 
debates on Japanese international strategy. As already noted, the tendency of much 
scholarship on Japan has been to emphasize stasis or general “immobilism” in its 
security policy, but if the ensuing article can reveal the conditions which will result, or 
have already resulted, in Japan’s shifting from a hedging to a balancing stance, then 
this will oblige reconsideration of the current Constructivist, Liberal and Neorealist 
interpretations which at times have bordered on dogma in their holding to a picture of 
continuity and moderation in Japanese security policy, even in the face of mounting 
signs of Japanese remilitarization.20  
                                                        
20 J. A. A. Stockwin, ‘Dynamic and Immobilist aspects of Japanese politics’, in J. A. A. Stockwin, Alan 
Rix, Aurelia George, James Horne, Daiichi Ito and Martin Collick, Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in 





The purpose of this paper is certainly not to suggest that any of these perspectives is 
theoretically bankrupt, and more to argue for the need for “analytical eclecticism”.21 
But it also argues for an eclecticism or consensual approach that is not stuck in a rut of 
arguing for continuity when the evidence is patently increasing of change in Japan’s 
surrounding international structure and domestic policy processes that should generate 
change in its international and security strategy. This is especially so when the logic of 
many of these perspectives’ own assumptions indicates the conditions for, and thus is 
in conformity with, the evidence for the possibility of Japan deviating from its post-war 
course of international strategy.  
 
The broader conclusion this article drives toward in considering Japan’s propensity for 
change in international strategy and a shift toward balancing behavior is that Japan is 
now adopting a posture which might be termed “Resentful Realism”, rather than the 
more prevalent model of “Reluctant Realism”. 22  Japan, in contrast to Reluctant 
Realism’s positing of a restrained Japanese security stance closely and largely 
                                                        
21 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, ‘Japan, Asia-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical 
Eclecticism’, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2001, pp. 153-185; Yasuhiro Izumikawa, 
‘Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan’s Security Policy’, 
International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2010, pp. 123-160. 
22 Christopher W. Hughes, ‘The Democratic Party of Japan’s New (But Failing) Grand Security Strategy: 
From “Reluctant Realism” to “Resentful Realism”?’ Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2012, 
pp. 109-140. 
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satisfactorily aligned with the U.S., is now flirting with a more unpredictable form of 
security policy. This Japanese security stance is driven predominantly by concerns 
about China’s rise, and will surely involve to a great extent close alignment with U.S. 
hedging and balancing strategies toward China. Nonetheless, Japan’s “Resentful 
Realism” is likely at the same time to be characterized by heightened Japanese concerns 
vis-à-vis not just China but also the robustness of U.S. security guarantees, and 
especially entrapment and abandonment concerns.  
 
The result is a Japan that will feel obliged to experiment with aspirations for greater 
international autonomy, and fluctuate between hedging and hard balancing toward 
China. All of this may make Japan a more “Realist” power ready to balance, but also 
one that is far less consistent in the execution of balancing strategies. In addition, 
Japan’s “Resentful Realism” will differ from standard Realist balancing impulses 
because it is likely to acquire a new unpredictability given that it is more emotionally 
charged with Revisionist sentiments that indeed resent dependence on the U.S. or 
surpassing by China as being detrimental to national morale and producing in turn 
strong and uncertain counter-reactions. Thus, contrary to the hopes of many in Japan 
and the U.S. that have advocated a more “normal” security policy, these changes will 
actually make Japan a destabilizing rather than stabilizing presence in the regional 
security landscape. This can only further exacerbate the condition of already precarious 
Sino-Japanese security relations.   
 
Explaining Impulses and Shifts Toward Balancing and Away from Hedging 
If many of the theories already currently applied to explaining Japan’s international 
strategy have concluded that it has adopted a restrained and hedging posture to eschew 
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overt balancing, it is a logical inverse corollary that these perspectives must provide 
insights into the conditions and timing for both ceasing to hedge and pivoting toward a 
balancing strategy. Variants of Neorealism and Liberalism indicate a number of ways 
in which “secondary states” or “second-tier powers” such as Japan may react to changes 
in the distribution of capabilities and the international structure—manifested in 
adjustments to the balance of power, or more drastically systemic power transitions and 
hegemonic rises and falls—and how these may precipitate reconsiderations of grand 
strategies.23  
 
Offensive Realism presents the default position that states confronting changes in the 
international structure and disadvantageous movements in relative gains will seek to 
initiate balancing to restore equilibrium, or, if this is not possible, more rarely 
bandwagoning behavior. 24  For Offensive Realism, the underlying conditions to 
precipitate balancing are concerns over disadvantageous movements in relative 
capabilities and gains, the assumption that security is scarce, and that states must 
consequently maximize power to overcome these challenges. States will seek to “hard 
balance” both internally through the build-up of their own national and autonomous 
military capabilities, and externally through the aggregation of capabilities with 
alliance and coalition partners, even if this entails attendant risks of entrapment and 
                                                        
23 Robert S. Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in 
East Asia’, Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2010, pp. 355-395. 
24 John, J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 
2001). 
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abandonment imposed by the senior ally.25 Offensive Realism has also indicated that 
great powers or secondary states might pursue a “soft balance” against an existing 
hegemonic or rising power, through agendas designed to diplomatically, economically, 
and less often militarily, complicate their exercise of dominance.26  
 
If Offensive Realism represents the type of position of balancing that states may 
gravitate toward under certain, and perhaps extreme, conditions, then Defensive 
Realism, as another variant of Neorealism, indicates the alternative conditions that may 
pertain for states to pursue more restrained balancing and alternative strategies of 
hedging. Again, the logical inverse corollary applies that the deterioration or absence 
of these conditions for refraining from hedging should generate balancing behavior 
along the lines of Offensive Realism’s predictions.  
 
Defensive Realism argues that states view changes in relative capabilities as less 
concerning and security less scarce, and thus may undertake less radical balancing 
behavior, based on several assumptions. First, states in considering the need to balance 
against capabilities will take into account the variables of geography in enhancing their 
security, and most importantly the perceived “offense-defense balance” between 
military technologies, provided either through a state’s internal capabilities or 
                                                        
25 Glenn H. Snyder, ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’, World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1984, 
pp. 461-495.  
26 T. V. Paul, ‘Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy’, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2005, 
pp. 46-71; Robert Pape, ‘Soft Balancing against the United States’, International Security, Vol. 30. No. 
1, 2005, pp. 7-45; Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, ‘Hard Times for Soft Balancing’, 
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2005, pp. 72-108.  
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externally by an ally, with a defensive superiority tending toward restraining the need 
for Offensive Realism-type active balancing.27 Second, states are seen to balance not 
just capabilities but also threats and intentions. 28  Somewhat surprisingly, despite 
Defensive Realism’s emphasis on the perception of threat as the key trigger for 
balancing behavior, it has not always been precise or fulsome on defining under what 
conditions or in line with what “indices” another state’s behavior may be perceived as 
threatening.29 More recent analysis, though, has begun to pinpoint more exactly these 
detailed conditions for sensing threats.  
 
States will evaluate the benign or malign intentions of states, judged through a menu of 
criteria including knowledge of the predictability of and compatibility with other states’ 
political leadership and ideologies; their observation of bilateral agreements and 
                                                        
27 Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1978, 
pp.167-214; Jack S. Levy, ‘The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and 
Historical Analysis’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1984, pp. 219-238; Sean M. Lynn-
Jones, ‘Offense-Defense Theory and its Critics’, Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1995, pp. 660-691; 
Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, ‘What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure 
It?’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1998, pp. 44-82; Stephen Van Evera, ‘Offense, Defense, and 
the Causes of War’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1998, pp. 5-42; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘Seeking 
Security Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2000-
2001, pp. 136-141; Robert S. Ross, ‘The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century’, 
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1999, pp. 109-111. 
28 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 17-
49. 
29 For early studies in the Defensive Realism tradition to elaborate the indices that impact on the image 
and thus threat perception of states, see Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).  
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treaties; their commitment to economic partnerships; and their meaningful cooperative 
participation in multilateral institutions.30 In addition, states may evaluate the intentions 
of other states as benign or malign based on the degree to which they are perceived as 
malleable and their capacity to influence them through means such as political and 
economic engagement.31  
 
Neoclassical Realism adds to Defensive Realism’s analysis of intentions by arguing 
that states my refrain from balancing, or mistakenly “underbalance” despite strategic 
needs, due to domestic political conditions. These conditions comprise: elite consensus 
or fragmentation concerning the nature and response to potential threats; degrees of 
wider social cohesion in agreeing or dissenting over the nature of the threat and 
response; and the degree of the legitimacy of the state’s government, entailing, 
according to Neoclassical Realism, a higher degree of legitimacy leading to a higher 
preparedness to balance robustly.32  
 
The presence of these conditions of an offense-defense balance privileging defensive 
technologies; a reading of other states’ intentions as benign and as subject to 
malleability; and a domestic consensus unfavorable to reading intentions as strictly 
malign, should thus limit inclinations to actively hard or soft balance, and open up space 
                                                        
30 David M. Edelstein, ‘Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers’, 
Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2002, pp. 10-13; Steve Chan, Looking for Balance: China, the United 
States and Power Balancing in East Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
31 Edelstein, ‘Managing uncertainty’, pp. 13-14. 
32 Schweller, Unanswered Threats, pp. 11-12; Randall Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats: a Neoclassical 
Realist Theory of Underbalancing’, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2004, pp. 159-201. 
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for alternative strategies, or more specifically hedging. Thus, in line with Defensive 
Realism’s assumptions, states may pursue minimalist balancing internally and 
externally, but also strategies of engagement, or in the case of smaller states “omni-
enmeshment” to influence and moderate the behavior of other states to obviate the need 
for harder balancing.33  
 
It is in these engagement strategies that elements of Defensive Realism crossover with 
strains of Liberal perspectives on state strategies to respond to hegemonic power 
transitions. For even though Liberalism clearly starts with very different assumptions 
about state preoccupations with absolute rather than relative gains, it does share similar 
assumptions that other states’ behavior can be influenced through engagement as with 
Defensive Realism’s recognition of the possibilities of hedging to effect state 
objectives.34 Indeed, this type of crossover between Defensive Realism and Liberalism 
in possible scenarios of power transition can be found in the concept of the U.S.’s 
“Liberal Grand Strategy” as a means to induce rising states such as China to 
demonstrate their benign intentions, act as “status quo powers”, and conform to the 
existing liberal hegemonic order.35 Liberalism’s belief in the utility of engagement to 
                                                        
33 Goh, ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia’, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, 
2007/2008, pp. 113-157. 
34 David A. Lake, ‘Great Power Hierarchies and Strategies in Twenty First Century World Politics’, in 
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations, 
(London: Sage, 2002), pp. 555-579. 
35 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World 
Order (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 333-360; Barry Buzan, ‘China in 
International Society: Is “Peaceful Rise” Possible?’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 
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respond to rising powers corresponds to Defensive Realism’s stress on the importance 
of the comprehensibility and malleability of the intentions of other states, and thus 
focuses on attempts to shape benign intentions through a number of mechanisms: the 
promotion of economic interdependence to raise the costs of conflict; seeking to embed 
other states in regional and multilateral institutions; and supporting the development of 
pluralistic and liberal values in other states’ domestic political systems to promote the 
conditions for cooperation.  
 
In combination, therefore, Defensive Realism and Liberalism indicate a range of 
overarching conditions and facilitating sub-conditions—superiority of defensive 
capabilities, predictability and malleability of other states’ intentions, domestic political 
constraints ill-disposed to balancing, and the believed utility of various engagement 
mechanisms—that if prevalent enable states to exercise hedging strategies. Conversely, 
though, if any of these conditions deteriorates or is absent, then it is probable a state 
may shift gears back to a form of default Offensive Realism and soft and hard 
balancing.  
 
These conditions and Japan’s correspondence to them in the case of China are 
summarized in Table 1. The next sections of this paper move on to examine the extent 
to which Japan has in the past and continues to devise its China policy in the presence 
of these conditions, thus enabling it to maintain a Defensive Realist-Liberal Grand 
Strategy type of international strategy characterized by hedging, or whether these 
                                                        
3, 2010, pp. 5-36; Alastair Iain Johnson, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power?’, International Security, Vol. 27, 
No. 4, 2003, pp. 5-56. 
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Table: Japan’s Degree of Conformity with the Prevalence or Absence of Conditions that Determine the Predilection to Engage, Hedge 





Facilitating conditions Cold War and early 




soft and hard 
balancing 
Later post-Cold War 
and contemporary  




soft and hard 
balancing 
Defensive Realism Offense-Defense balance 
favorable 
Dominance of national 
defense capabilities 
Prevalent  Deteriorating  
  Dominance of national 
defense capabilities 
Prevalent  Deteriorating  
 Intentions perceived as 
benign 
Predictability/compatibility 
of bilateral leaderships and 
ideologies 
Prevalent  Deteriorating/absent  
  Observation of bilateral 
treaties and agreements 
Emerging/Prevalent  Deteriorating  
  Commitment to bilateral 
economic partnerships 
Emerging/Prevalent  Deteriorating  




Deteriorating SOFT BALANCING/ 
INCIPIENT HARD 
BALANCING 
 Intentions perceived as 
malleable toward benignity 
 Prevalent  Deteriorating/absent  
 Domestic politics disposed 
to “underbalancing” 
Political elites’ consensus 
on potential threats as 
minimal 
Prevalent  Deteriorating/absent  
  Societal consensus on 
nature of potential threats as 
minimal 
Prevalent  Deteriorating/absent  
Liberalism Intentions perceived as 
malleable toward benignity 
Economic interdependency 
outweighing costs of 
conflict 
Prevalent  Deteriorating  
  Embedding of relations in 
cooperative multilateral and 
regional frameworks 
Emerging  Deteriorating  
  Development of 
complementary political 
and societal pluralistic 
values  
Emerging  Deteriorating/absent  
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Japan’s Past Hedging Strategy Toward China 
If Japan’s international strategy is evaluated throughout most of the postwar period up 
until the first decade of the new millennium—and thus at the point when it perhaps 
received the most sustained analysis and the theoretical orthodoxies were in put in place 
that carry over to the present day—it can be said very much to conform to a restrained 
balancing or hedging stance in response to the emerging transformation of the 
surrounding regional system. Japan’s “Yoshida Doctrine” as grand strategy has in many 
ways been a classic manifestation of hedging and the “Pragmatist” approach, made 
possible by a set of conditions conducive to restrained alignment and balancing with 
U.S. and engagement of a rising China.36  
 
Reading and Molding China’s Intentions 
In terms of Defensive Realism’s facilitating conditions, Japan’s sense of the need to 
consider balancing for much of this period was clearly mitigated by the belief that China 
actually posed little meaningful threat because of its largely benign, or at the very least 
carefully contained malign, intentions. Japan’s political leadership during the Cold War 
were predominantly preoccupied with the threat from the USSR which was viewed as 
holding genuinely malign intentions, even stretching to the likelihood of nuclear attack 
and territorial invasion. By contrast, the majority of Japanese policy-makers generally 
regarded the Communist Party of China (CCP) as a regime focused on political and 
economic survival and state-building from prolonged periods of civil war, foreign 
interventions and confrontations with the USSR and U.S., and one that would prove 
                                                        
36 For the “Yoshida Doctrine” as pursued by Japan’s strategic “Pragmatists” see, Richard J. Samuels, 
Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2007), pp. 31-33. 
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vital to work with for Japan’s own economic prosperity in the long run.37 Instead, rather 
than domestic policy opinion, the greater complication for Japan’s relations with 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) was the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and as the 
corollary the necessary maintenance of relations with Taiwan and the lack of 
normalized diplomatic relations with the mainland.38  
 
Nevertheless, Japan and China were able throughout much of the Cold War, and 
especially after U.S.-China rapprochement and the normalization of Sino-Japanese 
relations in 1972 and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, to read 
each other’s intentions and to establish a relatively comfortable modus vivendi. Japan’s 
political and bureaucratic leaders, if measured against Defensive Realism’s criteria for 
assessing other states’ intentions, shared confidence that they maintained sufficiently 
close personal connections or “pipes” with the CCP to predict state ideology and benign 
intentions.39 In particular, the LDP’s Tanaka-Takeshita and Ikeda-Miyazawa factions, 
the former responsible for the normalization of ties, felt they knew China’s key leaders 
well enough to negotiate and defuse any tensions.  
 
                                                        
37 Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 99-105. 
38  Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson, Japan’s International 
Relations: Politics, Economics and Security (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 166-168. 
39  Iwanaga Kenkichirō, Sengo Nihon no Seitō to Gaikō (Postwar Japanese Political Parties and 
Diplomacy) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1985); Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: pp. 101-
105. 
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Japanese leaders, just as with the rest of the region, were taken aback by China’s 
internal convulsions during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, and were 
cognizant of the CCP’s periodic launching of “people’s diplomacy” and domestic anti-
Japanese historical sentiment in order to pressure Japan over relations with the U.S. and 
Taiwan. At the same time, though, Japan’s policy-makers were confident that 
communist and anti-Japanese ideology was subordinated to a pragmatic Chinese need 
to engage with Japan economically and to assist in building influence against the USSR 
in the midst of the Sino-Soviet split. Japan and China’s leadership were thus able to 
shelve issues of nationalist contention such as colonial history and territorial disputes.40 
Both sides also enjoyed confidence that the 1972 Joint Communiqué and the Sino-
Japanese peace treaty were agreements that worked to establish common principles for 
interaction, including no explicit references to, and thus no politicization, of history; 
non-interference; non-aggression; the peaceful resolution of disputes; and the non-
pursuit of hegemony by either state.41  
 
Moreover, not only did Japanese policy-makers feel that through this “1972 system” of 
bilateral relations they could gauge China’s intentions but they also held a conviction 
these intentions could be subject to malleability.42 The CCP was perceived as a regime 
                                                        
40 Thomas U. Berger, War, Guilt, and Politics After World War II (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), pp. 161-164; James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in 
China’s Japan Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 55-97. 
41 Ryōsei Kokubun, ‘Changing Japanese Strategic Thought Toward China’, in Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko 
Togo and Joseph P. Ferguson, eds., Japanese Strategic Thought Toward Asia (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), pp. 137-158. 
42 Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, pp. 84-86.  
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utilizing communist ideology to unify China rather than inherently holding to this 
ideology itself. Japanese policy-makers were particularly encouraged that China could 
be encouraged to forge closer bilateral ties and reintegrate itself into the regional order 
following the end of the Cultural Revolution and the installment in power of Deng 
Xiaoping and the “second generation” of leadership, and the regime’s subsequent 
concentration on “opening up” and economic reform. Japanese leaders were convinced 
from the 1980s onwards that they possessed the opportunity and the political but above 
all economic capacity to influence China’s international strategy through supporting its 
domestic reformers and economic engagement. Japan’s confidence in the movement 
toward reform and how this would promote cooperative relations was such that it was 
even at the forefront of efforts to avoid the international isolation of China following 
the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.  
 
Domestic Consensus 
Japan’s interest to engage China, and avoid any move toward containment, was 
reinforced in this period by a general domestic policy consensus. The majority of 
policy-makers involved in relations with China, including the LDP’s “mainstream” 
Tanaka-Takeshita and Ikeda-Miyazawa factions and other political parties such as the 
Kōmeitō (later New Kōmeitō); and MOFA, and especially its then powerful China and 
Mongolia Division, favored engagement to induce cooperation.43 For sure, there were 
more “Revisionist” elements of Japan’s political leadership in the LDP, such as the 
Kishi (later Machimura, and now Hosoda) faction, that regarded China as a genuine 
communist threat and source of instability à la the pre-war period, and favored capitalist 
                                                        
43 Tanaka Akihiko, Nicchū Kankei 1945-1990 (Sino-Japanese Relations 1945-1990) (Tokyo: Tōkyō 
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Taiwan instead, but these were largely pushed aside by the mainstream of the LDP.44 
Similarly, at the broader societal level, Japanese public opinion in this period 
maintained a very positive, for some even “romanticized” view, of Sino-Japanese 
relations, underpinned by a sense of common language and race (dōbun dōshu).45 Just 
as importantly, the Japanese business community was supportive of engagement, and 
deeply interested in the emerging trade and investment opportunities in the Chinese 
market.46  
 
Based on this view of the intelligibility and malleability of China’s intentions, Japan 
attempted to generate benign interaction through a variety of economic engagement 
mechanisms and its own type of mini-Grand Liberal Strategy. Japan’s government 
sought to undergird the conditions for economic engagement through its very 
substantial provision of ODA from 1979 to 2008, totaling between 1979 to 2005 ¥3.13 
trillion in loan aid, ¥145.7 billion in grant aid, and ¥144.6 billion in technical 
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cooperation. 47  This ODA, coupled with Japanese industry’s need for offshore 
productions sites and markets led to a progressive expansion of Japanese foreign direct 
investment (FD) and bilateral trade, resulting in China becoming Japan’s largest trading 
partner by 2007 and the largest cumulative investor in China, while Japan is China’s 
second largest individual national trade partner as of 2014.  
 
Offense-Defense Balance 
Japan’s pursuit of the engagement of China was reinforced above all by the offense-
defense capabilities’ balance. Japan’s relative geographical proximity to China and any 
sense of threat was mitigated, of course, by the maritime sea space between the two 
states. But for the entire Cold War and into the first two decades of the new millennium 
Japanese policy-makers were confident that the balance of defensive capabilities, both 
conventional and nuclear, was fully in Japan’s favor. The Japan Self Defense Forces 
(JSDF) by the mid-1980s, primarily in order to counter the threat of Soviet 
expansionism in East Asia, had developed maritime and air capabilities that enabled it 
to control and defend the territorial space around the Japanese archipelago. Japan’s 
internal capabilities complemented and reinforced the overwhelming military power of 
the U.S. in the region, channeled via the U.S.-Japan security treaty and its evolution 
into an overt “alliance relationship” by the 1980s. 48  Japanese policy-makers were 
doubly relaxed about China’s military posture because they understood the PLA’s 
principal roles to be the preservation of internal regime security and immediate 
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territorial integrity vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and possessed only limited maritime and 
air power projection beyond its existing borders. Even China’s acquisition of nuclear 
weapons and delivery systems from the 1960s onwards failed to perturb seriously 
Japan’s defense planners, given the PLA’s limited number of missiles and warheads, 
and most importantly the perceived solidity of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence.49  
 
Japan’s concerns over China’s military posture certainly did increase from the mid-
1990s onwards with signs the PLA’s growing budgets and modernization, and the 
Chinese state’s willingness to project military power in pursuit of its national interests, 
as manifested in the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Straits crises which occurred in close 
proximity to Japan’s territorial waters. Nonetheless, Japanese policy-makers still saw 
China’s security activity as somewhat geographically distant in being concentrated 
around Taiwan, and drew confidence from Japan’s continuing conventional superiority 
and the U.S.’s demonstrated ability to project power and intervene in potential regional 
conflicts as with its deployment of the U.S. Seventh Fleet around Taiwan.  
 
Japan and the U.S. did begin to shift somewhat toward hedging against a rising China 
from the early post-Cold War period and mid-1990s onwards, but for Japan this was 
indeed highly constrained internal and external balancing. In fact, Japan’s international 
strategy was directed almost as much toward hedging against entrapment and 
abandonment by the U.S. in potential Taiwan or North Korea contingencies as it was 
against hedging against China.  
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Japan’s policy-makers were concerned that in the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis 
they risked embroilment in another Korean Peninsula conflict as the U.S. sought to 
activate the U.S.-Japan alliance to provide logistical support, but at the same time were 
aware that their lack of preparedness for the interoperability of JSDF and alliance 
capabilities risked the opposite problem of the U.S. discarding Japan as a useful ally. 
Similarly, the Taiwan Straits crisis, although not generating U.S. direct calls for 
Japanese assistance, clearly posed questions about the extent to which Japan should 
support the U.S. militarily without becoming entrapped in any unwelcome Sino-U.S. 
conflict over Taiwan. Japan’s eventual response was the revision of its National 
Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1996, and the revision of the U.S.-Japan Defense 
Guidelines between 1997 and 1999: the former beginning to re-gear JSDF doctrines 
and capabilities to deal with threat other than the now defunct Soviet Union, and the 
latter beginning to fill in the areas of interoperability between the JSDF and U.S. 
military and the logistical support provided by Japan in regional contingencies.  
 
At the same time, though, Japan attempted to maintain strategic ambiguity by refusing 
to specify the exact geographical extent of its military commitments in a regional 
contingency, and to thereby constrain any U.S. balancing of China by allowing the U.S. 
to take for granted Japanese military support, or any attempts by China to destabilize 
the status quo by being able to divine the extent of Japan’s support for the U.S.50 Japan 
thus continued its “dual hedge” tactics both inside and outside the alliance.51  
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All in all, Japan’s international strategy post-Cold War, and from the 1990s into the 
early 2000s, can be said to have corresponded to a form of “circumscribed balancing”, 
“Liberal Deterrence”, or “Reluctant Realism”, as it edged toward some balancing 
against a rising China but without overcommitting to this strategy or the U.S.52 The 
Defensive Realist and Constructivist analysis is thus correct in that Japan’s balancing 
was highly constrained and embedded within a far more dominant strategy of hedging, 
based on the reading and influencing of China’s intentions. In this period, somewhat 
ironically, despite their ostensibly different societal differences, Japan and China were 
both status quo powers and pragmatic in their bilateral dealings. The occasional spat 
over history textbooks was experienced as in 1982, but by and large the concentration 
was on economic engagement. Japan’s grand strategy and the approach to China within 
it was summed up by Prime Minister Yoshida’s famous dictum that: “Red or white, 
China remains our next-door neighbor. Geography and economic laws will, I believe, 
prevail in the long run over any ideological differences and artificial trade barriers”.53 
 
Japan’s Shifting Calculus Over China’s Intentions and Capabilities 
Japan’s international strategy vis-à-vis China into the mid-2000s might be characterized 
by hedging behavior, but the vital question is whether the conditions that made this 
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strategy possible are now deteriorating to the point of engineering a shift, even if 
incremental and at times fitful, in Japan’s policy toward a more active balancing 
strategy. For it is arguable that evidence is mounting that most of the key conditions 
identified by Defensive Realism and Liberalism as accounting for Japan’s past 
constraints are now coming under severe stress as the 1972 system for bilateral 
interaction unravels.  
 
China’s Intentions as Non-transparent and Malign, and Changing Domestic Consensus 
First, Japanese policy-makers’ confidence in their capacity to read China’s probable 
intentions has been progressively undermined. In part, this is the result of the transition 
in China’s leadership from the third, to fourth, and then fifth generations, mirrored by 
a similar process of the turnover of party factional and regime leadership in Japan, so 
leading to a straightforward breakdown of personal lines of communications.54 The 
LDP’s younger generation of leaders lack good personal relations with their Chinese 
counterparts, steeped increasingly instead as many are in U.S.-Japan policy-making 
networks. Most strikingly, with the exception of Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo (2007-
2008), who has served whilst in office and then later behind the scenes as an important 
conduit for attempts to reboot Sino-Japanese ties, LDP prime ministers from Koizumi 
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Junichirō (2001-2006) onwards have all struggled to build and sustain a relationship 
with their Chinese counterparts.55  
 
Koizumi, of course, was to position himself as the ultimate persona non grata with 
China’s leadership, unable to effect a full bilateral summit for five years. Abe Shinzō 
(2006-2007) and Asō Tarō (2008-2009) have both been regarded with suspicion as anti-
Chinese. Asō notably as foreign minister in 2005 publicly remarked that China’s 
military modernization build-up was “on course to pose a considerable threat” to 
Japan.56 Abe, although more guarded in his public statements on China as befits a two-
time prime minister, nevertheless detailed his suspicions in December 2012, just prior 
to returning the premiership. Abe noted that China’s maritime activities would lead to 
the South China Sea becoming “Lake Beijing”, compared China’s activities to those of 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, were sufficient to “scare” its neighbors, and that 
“Japan must not yield” to Chinese coercion in the East China Sea.57 Abe in his second 
administration has experienced a similar inability as his successors to establish personal 
contacts with his counterpart—being unable after taking office to hold a bilateral 
summit with first Hu Jintao, and then only managing, nearly two years after taking 
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power, a rather frosty first summit with Xi Jinping at the Beijing Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) meeting in November 2014.  
 
Many younger DPJ politicians have shared with the LDP a new suspicion of China, for 
example, Maehara Seiji, a noted security hawk and former DPJ foreign minister, when 
serving as the leader of the DPJ in December 2005 at a public forum in Washington 
D.C. described China’s military build-up as a “realistic threat” (genjitsu na kyōi) to 
Japan.58 The DPJ’s “elder statesmen” former leader Ozawa Ichirō and Prime Minister 
Hatoyama Yukio (2009-2010) did attempt to rebuild these connections through 
initiatives to expand bilateral elite-to-elite visits.59 But the DPJ’s implosion after its 
brief spell in power from 2009-2012, and the taking over of that party by lawmakers 
similar to the LDP in being less well-connected to China, including prime ministers 
Kan Naoto (2010-11) and Noda Yoshihiko (2011-12), has served to compound 
Japanese policy-makers’ inherent lack of ability to read the intentions of China’s 
leadership.60  
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Meanwhile, Japanese bureaucratic-level interaction with regard to China has also 
become more constrained in the post-Cold War period. MOFA’s China and Mongolia 
Division has retreated in influence compared to the rise of the North American Affairs 
Bureau as the gatekeeper of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Instead, much of the direction of 
Japan’s policy toward China has been directed recently by Yachi Shōtarō, a former 
MOFA Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, now Director of the National Security 
Council, and one of Abe’s key foreign policy advisors.  
 
The Japanese leaderships’ lack of acquaintance with their Chinese counterparts is 
symptomatic of and compounds a larger structural change in relations which has made 
it harder for Japan to understand China’s intentions. Japan’s leaders perceive that 
China’s leadership transition and rapid economic development, and the accompanying 
challenges to the competency and legitimacy of the CCP to continue to govern, have 
triggered shifts in China’s domestic and international ideology. As Prime Minister 
Abe’s 2015 advisory panel on Japan’s history and international role noted, the CCP’s 
effective abandonment of communism as a mainstay ideology in favor of “patriotic 
education” in order to boost its domestic legitimacy has inevitably spilled over to 
impact negatively on Sino-Japanese relations.61 The promotion of “patriotic education” 
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based on the recovery of national pride from past external aggressions is necessarily 
co-axial with the promotion of previously suppressed anti-Japanese sentiment.62  
 
In turn, China’s shift toward nationalism has also been seen to engender a drive for the 
restoration of territorial integrity, including not just Taiwan but also China’s disputed 
territorial claims with Japan and ASEAN states in the East China Sea and South China 
Sea, and even more worryingly a potential drive toward displacing the U.S.-led order 
in the region and the assumption of hegemonic status in the Asia-Pacific.63 The LDP, 
for instance, has argued that China is engaged in a “struggle for hegemony” (haken 
sōdatsu) in East Asia.64 Koizumi’s foreign policy task force talked of Sino-Japanese 
relations now moving from a situation of “collaboration and co-existence” to one of 
potential “competition and friction”.65  
 
Japanese perceptions of China’s increasing ideological estrangement have been 
reinforced by concerns over a new Chinese unwillingness to demonstrate benign 
intentions through committing to bilateral and international agreements and 
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conventions. From the Japanese viewpoint, China has in recent years consistently 
intimated that it is prepared to transgress the principles of the 1978 Sino-Japanese 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship concerning the shelving of colonial history issues and 
the non-use of force in international disputes, and failed to abide by other bilateral 
agreements related to respect for Japanese intellectual property and food export safety 
standards. Hence, Japanese leaders have consistently stressed in any interactions 
possible with their counterparts that they look for ties to continue to be predicated on 
adherence to the “four basic documents” issued between the two sides in the post-war 
period, namely the 1972 Joint Statement of 1972, 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 
1998 Joint Declaration, and 2008 Joint Statement on Strengthening Exchange and 
Cooperation.66  
 
More recently, Japanese policy-makers have been disturbed by the Chinese central 
government’s apparent willingness to allow local courts to revisit provisions of the 
1978 peace treaty under which China has waived its right to colonial compensation. In 
April 2014, the Shanghai Maritime Court impounded a Mitsui OSK Lines (MOL) ship 
as a means to demand compensation from the parent company for failure to fulfill 
payments for the leasing of Chinese ships in the 1930s. MOL eventually negotiated a 
private payment of around U.S.$30 million. The Shanghai case followed a Beijing 
court’s acceptance of the hearing the same year of a case pursuing damages against 
Japan for forced labor in the colonial period. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide 
remarked in an April 2015 press conference regarding the MOL incident that, “the 
series of responses that China has made in connection with this matter, including the 
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latest seizure notice, may undermine the very foundation of the spirit of the 
normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations espoused in the 1972 Joint 
Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China”.67 
 
Japanese policy-makers have been further disappointed by the apparent reluctance of 
China to contribute to the maintenance of the “mutually beneficial relationship based 
on common strategic interests” that Prime Minister Abe initiated at the start of his first 
period of office in 2006 in order to restore bilateral ties following Koizumi’s 
premiership, and that was then followed through by successive LDP and DPJ prime 
ministers. From the Japanese perspective, China has failed to reciprocate on attempts 
to reboot ties through bilateral summitry to promote mutual trust, people-to-people 
exchanges, and cooperation in the wider Asia-Pacific region over issues such as North 
Korea’s nuclearization.  
 
Japan and China have attempted to move ahead with multilateral cooperation in the 
form of the Japan-China-Republic of Korea (ROK) Trilateral Cooperation Dialogue 
(TCD) since 2008, and have progressed certain elements of functional cooperation in 
the environment, finance, and negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA). 68 
However, deeper trilateral cooperation has been stymied by the standoff in Japan-China 
relations, and to some extent Japan-South Korea, relations over issues of history and 
                                                        
67 Prime Minister’s Office Japan, ‘Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary’, April 21, 2015, 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/tyoukanpress/201404/21_a.html. 
68  Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, ‘Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Searching for the Mode of 
Governance’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010, pp. 253-256. 
 39 
territory. The result is that TCD summits were held in abeyance from 2012 to 2015 and 
the Japan-China-ROK FTA negotiations slowed to a near standstill. China and South 
Korea only agreed in September 2015 to restart the TCD summits. But Xi and President 
Park Guen-hye made this decision bilaterally without first consulting with Japan and 
during Park’s attendance at the events in Beijing to commemorate the seventieth 
anniversary of the defeat of Japan and end of World War Two, so perhaps providing 
not the most auspicious of environments for the rebooting of the TCD. The first TCD 
summit for over three years held in Seoul on 1 November 2015, including a bilateral 
meeting between Abe and Chinese prime minister Li Keqiang, sought to restore some 
normality to ties with an agreement to restart various trilateral economic and political 
cooperation projects, but the summit was also overshadowed by Chinese and South 
Korean suspicions and insistence that Japan demonstrate correct behavior on issues of 
history.69  
 
Similarly, in regard to broader multilateral cooperation in the region, Japanese concerns 
over China’s meaningful and benign intentions have heightened. Japan and China 
continue to cooperate in the financial arena through their role in the ASEAN-Plus-
Three’s Chiang Mai Initiative. But increasingly worrying for Japan is China’s initiation 
of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to function as an apparent counter-
institution to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) traditionally led by Japan, and with 
perceived poorer standards of governance in loan-making, and resulting in Japan’s 
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refusal, along with the U.S., to accept the invitation to join. 70  Abe commented 
provocatively on the AIIB plan that, “a company that borrows money from a bad loan 
shark will end up losing its future”, and implied that Asian states would be at the mercy 
of malign Chinese influence.71  
 
For Japan, the most alarming evidence of the growing malignity of China’s intentions 
is its assertion of territorial and resource interests in the East China, South China Sea, 
and the sea lines of security (SLOC) in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond to the 
Persian Gulf. Japanese policy-makers argue that China first overturned the status quo 
and the agreed shelving of territorial disputes with its 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea 
explicitly laying claim to Japanese controlled areas in the East China Sea, and has since 
failed to conform to other established bilateral agreements on maritime cooperation.72 
These Japanese concerns have been made manifest by China’s expanding area of 
maritime operations and the constant dispatch of fishing vessels, “research ships” and 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels into Japan’s exclusive economic zone 
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(EEZ) around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands south of Okinawa Prefecture. 
These tensions reached a new high point in 2010 with the DPJ administration’s decision 
to not only detain but then also indict the captain of a Chinese trawler for attempting to 
ram a Japan Coast Guard (JCG) vessel that had warned his ship away from operating 
in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island waters, so sparking a major diplomatic row with China.  
 
Sino-Japanese relations have since escalated further from late 2012 onwards with the 
decision of the DPJ government to purchase and in effect “nationalize” two of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from their private owner and thus to assert clear de jure as well 
as de facto control. In response, China has significantly upped the level of its maritime 
activity around the islands, and in November 2013 established an Air Defense 
Identification Zone (ADIZ) overlapping with that of Japan’s extending around the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and thus further raising the bilateral ante on the territorial 
dispute. Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Katō Katsunobu summed up Japan’s alarm 
and position in response: “The Government of Japan expressed deep concern about 
China’s establishment of such a zone and obliging its own rules within the zone, which 
are profoundly dangerous acts that unilaterally change the status quo in the East China 
Sea, escalating the situation, and that may cause unintended consequences in the East 
China Sea.”73 
 
Japan-China tensions further north in the East China Sea have been intensified by 
overlapping EEZs and territorial claims to gas field resources. Despite Japan and China 
reaching an agreement in principle in 2008, as one outcome of the “mutually beneficial 
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relationship based on common strategic interests”, for the joint development of sections 
of the gas fields, there has been much Japanese frustration at China’s apparent 
reluctance since to respond to calls to move forward with bilateral development plans, 
and the suspicion remains that China is already moving to exert unilateral exploitation 
of the fields.74 The Japan Ministry of Defense’s (JMOD) Defense of Japan 2015 white 
paper—its release in July 2015 arguably timed to coincide with ongoing National Diet 
debates on the exercise of collective self-defense, and with sections on the China threat 
beefed up at the request of the LDP—provided the public news for the first time that 
China had started to construct new gas platforms in the East China Sea and that the 
Japanese government would continue to lodge “protests against China’s unilateral 
development”.75   In addition, Japanese policy-makers have seen China’s refusal to 
recognize as an islet Japan’s territory of Okinotorishima in the Philippine Sea, and its 
thereby attempted negation of Japan’s claims to the surrounding EEZ, as another 
challenge to the territorial status quo.  Japan has responded by announcing in February 
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2016 that it would spend ¥13 billion to rebuild an observation platform on the islet to 
assert its sovereignty.76  
 
Japan and China were able at the Abe-Xi summit in November 2014 to achieve some 
level of bilateral equilibrium on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute with issuing of a “joint 
statement” by both sides as the product of considerable behind-the-scene diplomatic 
negotiation. The “joint statement” was not really joint at all, as it was two separate 
statements on the issue of the islands: Tokyo maintained its stance there was no dispute 
in its eyes but that the two countries held different “views”; and Beijing that there were 
differing “positions” so holding to its stance of not relenting on the existence of a 
dispute.77 This diplomatic linguistic device enabled Japan and China at least to move 
forward with long-mooted attempts to create a bilateral crisis-management mechanism 
in the East China Sea, and there was some decline in Chinese maritime incursions 
around the islands in 2015. Nevertheless, the dispute remains an issue at a level of 
constant high-tension in Sino-Japanese relations. The JMOD’s 2015 Defense white 
paper stated that China’s activities in the East China and South China Sea were attempts 
to “alter the status quo by force”.78  
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Second, Japan’s waning confidence in the benign nature of China’s intentions has been 
matched by a declining confidence in its capacity to effect any malleability in those 
intentions. Japanese consistent economic engagement of China since the 1970s, 
including the disbursement of ODA, is acknowledged as without doubt promoting 
Chinese development and bilateral interdependence. However, Japan’s ODA provision 
has been regarded as having diminishing returns in influencing, most crucially, Chinese 
political behavior. Japan’s suspension of ODA grants in protest at China’s nuclear 
testing in 1995 and its failure to change Chinese behavior was a portent of the limited 
utility of ODA a lever of influence.79  
 
Japan’s extension of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI), production and trading 
linkages has clearly been a factor in restraining China’s behavior toward Japan even in 
the midst of the deepest tensions over history and territory. Nevertheless, there are signs 
of possible declines in the condition of this economic interdependency. For although 
Japan’s trade interdependency with China in terms of shares of exports and imports has 
remained steady at around 18 and 22 percent respectively over the last half-decade, 
Japanese outward FDI has begun to decline rapidly in recent years. From an historic 
high of U.S.$13.5 billion of Japanese FDI in China in 2012, investment flows fell to 
U.S.$9.1 billion in 2013, then halved to U.S.$6.7 billion in 2014. In part, the decline is 
accounted for by China’s economic slowdown, but also in large part by political 
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tensions affecting business confidence.80 The Sino-Japanese investment relationship 
and level of interdependency has also shown signs of declining not only absolutely but 
also relatively as Japanese FDI begins to shift to other regions in East Asia. Japanese 
FDI in the Newly Industrialized Economies-4 (NIES) of Hong Kong, Taiwan, South 
Korea and Singapore exceeded that in China for the first time in 2014 at U.S.$13.9 
billion; and investment in the ASEAN-4 of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines also outstripped that in China in 2014 at U.S.$11 billion (Chart 1). 
 
 
Moreover, Japanese policy-makers worry that aspects of the economic relationship are 
approaching one of asymmetric interdependence now tilted toward China.81 China’s 
perceived willingness to resort to “economic warfare” to achieve political and security 
ends was for Japan demonstrated by the alleged Chinese embargo on rare earth exports 
imposed after the 2010 tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and thus serving as 
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Chart 1: Japan's FDI flows in East Asia 2004-2014
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a portent of how China might increasingly hold the upper hand in the bilateral economic 
relationship.82  
 
Moreover, Japan’s own economic relative decline vis-à-vis China has meant that it feels 
it simply lacks sufficient capacity to exercise effective influence. Japan’s cessation of 
all ODA to China except for limited environmental cooperation after 2008 was justified 
on the basis that the program had largely achieved its objectives. But the ending was 
also the result of Japanese awareness that there were no longer the budgetary resources 
to provide large-scale ODA and that its utility in the light of China’s new found 
economic power was highly questionable.  
 
Third, Japanese failing confidence in the predictability and malleability of China’s 
intentions has been reinforced by an evolving domestic consensus at elite and societal 
levels regarding the future course of Sino-Japanese relations, and which has contributed 
to the obviating of any previous “underbalancing” impulses. For just as China has 
experienced a deep-seated domestic political transformation that has influenced its 
international strategy, so in Japan there has been a similar process of regime shift.83  
Japan’s LDP in power for close to sixty years in the post-war period has struggled to 
prove its competency to govern during a “lost decade” of economic decline that has 
actually now stretched to close to a quarter of a century. The result has been the 
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displacement of the LDP mainstream old guard and the domination of the party since 
the early 2000s by the revisionist Machimura-Hosoda faction.84 The LDP has then 
turned to a more nationalist ideology to enhance its legitimacy. This began to be 
manifested under Koizumi’s administration and his insistence on visiting Yasukuni 
Shrine. Abe’s first administration was marked by a degree of pragmatism with his 
crafting with China in 2007 of the “mutually beneficial strategic partnership” to try to 
re-right bilateral relations. However, on returning to power in 2012, Abe has revealed 
himself as an arch-revisionist, so creating the conditions for the exacerbation of tensions 
with China.  
 
Abe has espoused an ideological program that seeks to overturn the post-war settlement 
imposed on Japan after its defeat in the Pacific War and U.S.-led Occupation and which 
is believed to have suppressed Japanese national identity and independence. Abe and 
other Revisionists wish to revise Article 9 and the Constitution as a whole, as well as 
historical interpretations of Japan as a colonial aggressor, that are seen to constrain its 
exercise of military power for national security ends and prevent Japan from recovering 
great power international status. Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013 only 
confirmed for China and South Korea his status as a Revisionist and stopped in its tracks 
any diplomatic attempts to reboot bilateral ties.85  
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The “Abe Statement” released on 14 August 2015 on the eve of the seventieth 
anniversary of the end of World War Two might have been an occasion to alleviate 
significantly historical tensions. In the end, the statement, although highly skillful in 
not handing China any easy means to exert diplomatic leverage over Japan because it 
contained the key phraseology of acknowledging past “aggression”, “colonial rule”, 
“heartfelt apology” and “remorse”, and thus generally upheld previous government 
statements on the colonial wartime periods, did little to address mutual suspicions over 
history. The statement contained a long preamble about history, indicating that Japan 
had to respond to the onrush of Western colonialism, how Japan’s victory in the Russo-
Japanese war gave hope for self-determination to Asian states, and how Japan was in a 
sense forced into the Pacific War by the creation of Western economic blocs in the 
interwar period—all intimating classic right-wing justifications of Japan having fought 
to liberate East Asia and a defensive war against the West, and in which Japan was as 
much a casualty as other countries. Moreover, Abe preferred to talk of Japan’s past 
statements on history in general and studiously avoided using the first person to say that 
he himself sought to apologize or uphold past positions. Abe also remarked that “further 
generations to come” should not be “predestined to apologize”, so signaling his view 
was a line should now be drawn under any further acts of Japanese contrition for the 
war. 86  Even if Chinese policy-makers’ commentary on the “Abe Statement” was 
relatively muted, the reaction of China’s official media and social media was far more 
critical of Abe’s perceived reluctance to make a clear break with and apology for its 
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past militarism.87 Meanwhile, as noted above, the DPJ, despite purveying a more pro-
China stance under its older leaders, has also undergone internal changes that have 
brought to the fore younger and more nationalist-oriented politicians, many of whom 
share the same suspicions of their conservative LDP counterparts regarding China’s 
intentions.  
 
At the general societal level, there has also occurred a general turn away from viewing 
China’s intentions toward Japan as benign, precipitated by tensions over history, 
territory and other issues such as food safety scares, all of which reinforce the 
perception of China as an untrustworthy partner.88 Opinion polls taken over the long 
time series by Japan’s Cabinet Office, for instance, show that the proportion of the 
public feeling no sense of affinity with China, already strongly on the rise since 2004 
when there had been a rough parity with those feeling a sense of affinity at around the 
high 40 percent mark, had risen to 83 percent by 2014. By contrast, the level of Japanese 
feeling a sense of affinity with China has continued to fall since 2004, reaching an all-
time low in the survey period of 15 per cent in 2014 (Chart 2) 89 This decline in Japanese 
public feeling vis-à-vis China is not to say that the majority in Japan has necessarily 
lined up with the more radical Revisionist sentiments, and it is clear that public opinion 
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was also generally against Koizumi’s and Abe’s visits to Yasukuni.90 However, the 
most disturbing conclusion from the polling information is that, if at least there is no 
open antipathy toward China, there is perhaps indifference and a fatigue over what are 
seen as cynical Chinese demands for Japan to submit on history and territory. 
 
The consequence is Japanese policy-makers and citizenry, whilst themselves perhaps 
unconsciously mirroring Chinese behavior in dabbling with their own revisionist and 
nationalist stances, view their counterparts as shifting from a position of pragmatism to 
one of revisionism and dissatisfaction with the status quo. China is seen as intent to 
threaten the regional order and on the way to developing into a fundamentally malign 
international presence. The extent of Japanese suspicions of China’s intent was 
demonstrated by the exchanges of critiques between influential policy-makers in 
January 2014. At the start of the month, the Chinese and Japanese ambassadors to the 
UK entered into an extraordinary spat, describing their respective countries in Daily 
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Telegraph editorials as threats to regional stability and “Asia’s Voldemort”.91 Later in 
the month, during a media meeting on the sidelines of the Davos World Economic 
Summit, Abe caused an international stir by seeming to suggest that Japan-China 
relations were comparable to those of Great Britain and Germany before World War I 
with a lack of direct communication over intentions and when economic 
interdependency was insufficient to prevent the occurrence of conflict.92 
 
The Offense-Defense Balance Tilts Away From Japan 
Japan’s anxieties regarding China’s intentions have been matched and thus exacerbated 
by perceived shifts in the offense-defense capabilities balance, both internal and 
external. Japanese policy-makers have revised significantly upwards their estimates of 
China’s military capabilities in the post-Cold War given the PLA’s double-digit 
expansion of budgets and military modernization programs. The consistent assertion of 
Japanese policy-makers has been that China’s defense build-up lacks transparency, 
thereby adding to the problems of reading its intentions, but that what is readily 
apparent is the PLA’s determination to acquire for the first time capabilities that can 
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effectively threaten Japan’s core security interests.93 Japan in the face of China’s new 
military capabilities, coupled with expanded Chinese territorial ambitions beyond just 
Taiwan, now feels a new proximity for itself standing on the military frontline against 
China.94 
 
Japanese analysts argue the PLA is procuring capabilities that serve immediate 
asymmetric warfare ends of anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) in the sea and airspace 
surrounding China, and is attempting through a campaign of constant military and 
psychological intimidation to wrest away from Japan de facto control of disputed 
islands and maritime space.95 In turn, Japanese policy-makers fear that longer term 
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China’s military build-up is designed for the more symmetric warfare ends of 
penetrating offensively air, sea and land defenses locally; “area control” over the “first 
island chain”; the neutralization of the Japanese and U.S. naval presence; and to project 
military force on a par with other great powers in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. 
 
The Japan Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) has long been accustomed to maintaining 
qualitative superiority among the region’s powers, but the People’s Liberation Army 
Air Force (PLAAF) has begun for the first time to pose air defense challenges for Japan. 
The PLAAF’s introduction of fourth generation fighters since the late 1990s in the 
shape of the J-10, J-11B, Su-27, Su-30MKK, and Su-30MK2, and then the fact that the 
proportion of inventory of these fighters has risen to around one third by 2014, has now 
raised concerns that the ASDF’s ageing fleet of F4-Js and F-15Js may be rapidly losing 
its edge in air superiority.96 PLA Second Artillery Corps’ ballistic missile forces, in the 
shape of DF-15/CSS-6 and DF-3/CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), 
although clearly directed primarily at Taiwan rather than Japan, pose concerns in that 
they are capable of striking JSDF and U.S. Air Force (USAF), U.S. Navy (USN) and 
U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces stationed in Japan itself.  
 
MSDF concerns toward China revolve around its modernization of a range of anti-
access and blue water maritime capabilities. The PLAN’s introduction of the Kilo, Yuan 
and Song-class diesel-powered and Shang-class nuclear-powered submarines with 
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quieting technologies complicate the MSDF’s traditional defensive role in keeping the 
seas around Japan free from enemy submarines for the U.S. Seventh Fleet to 
concentrate on the effective projection of offensive power. The PLAN’s Luyang-class 
and Luzhou-class guided missile destroyers with a fleet air defense role, combined with 
Sovremenny-class “anti-ship destroyers” capable of targeting U.S. aircraft carriers, and 
the introduction of Jiangkai-class guided missile frigates with “stealth” characteristics, 
demonstrate China’s potential to deploy modern fleet formations and to seriously 
complicate Japanese and U.S. naval dominance in the region.  
 
China’s pursuit of aircraft carriers through the refit of the ex-Soviet Varyag as its new 
Liaoning carrier commissioned in 2012, and speculation in 2015 that it is laying down 
the hull for a second indigenous produced carrier, has generated intense interest in 
Japan; for while it is recognized that Chinese carriers are likely to lag far behind those 
of the U.S. in capability, it is nevertheless taken as yet another sign of a determination 
to pursue offensive power projection and to challenge the U.S.’s effective monopoly in 
this area. An additional concern for Japanese planners is China’s upgrading of its 
amphibious warfare capabilities with Yuzhao-class landing ships, which might form 
part of a plan to seize Japanese southern islands in a contingency. 
 
Japanese concerns over the PLA’s potential to surpass the JSDF’s internal balancing 
capabilities are exacerbated even further by the increasing Chinese challenge to the U.S. 
role as an external balancer. Japanese policy-makers for the first time in the post-war 
period have begun to entertain serious doubts over whether the U.S. possesses the 
necessary military power to counter Chinese probing and access-denial strategies that 
most directly impact on Japan’s security in regard to territorial disputes and SLOC 
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security. China’s A2/AD strategy is feared to impose costs on the U.S. military that 
might prevent it from the type of intervention in regional contingencies as practiced in 
the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis. China’s ability to strike USAF Kadena in Okinawa, 
or USAF, USN and USMC assets at Iwakuni, Misawa and Yokota in Honshū, is seen 
to risk incapacitating U.S. forces in the event of a crisis.97  
 
Even more worrying for Japan long-term is China’s development of anti-ship ballistic 
missiles (ASBM) capable of striking U.S. aircraft carriers operating out of Japan and in 
the Asia-Pacific and which might severely undermine the U.S. force projection and 
deterrent posture in the region.98 Japanese policy-makers hold out considerable hope 
for the U.S.’s Air-Sea Battle Concept to overcome China’s A2/AD, but are concerned 
as to whether the U.S. is as yet deploying the full range of naval and air capabilities 
necessary to effect what is as yet a not entirely clear strategy, and whether it also has 
sufficient budgetary capacity to really pivot its military might to the Asia-Pacific to 
counter China’s rising power.99 
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Japanese anxieties over the sufficiency of the U.S.’s extant military capabilities to 
control the “global commons” and enable intervention in the East Asia theatre have in 
turn raised questions about the impact on broader U.S. political and military security 
guarantees for Japan.100 Japanese policy-makers now fear the raised prospect of U.S. 
abandonment in a situation of strategic accommodation between the U.S. and China, 
and if Japan’s security interests are deemed by the U.S. to fall short of the necessary 
threshold for convergence with its own core interests and to warrant the mobilization 
of its forces in defense of Japan. This risk is seen as especially likely if the cost is 
constantly rising of the deployment of U.S. forces in the face of Chinese A2/AD 
strategies. The lingering suspicion of some Japanese analysts is that the defense of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, even though included under the scope of Article 5 of the 
bilateral security treaty due to their being under Japanese administration and drawing 
renewed reassurances from the U.S. since 2010, could be just such an issue where the 
U.S. would be reluctant to intervene on Japan’s behalf for fear of putting the entire 
Sino-U.S. relationship at risk; and especially if China were to seize the islands first and 
the prospect was of the U.S. and Japan attempting to recover the territories from China 
in a full-scale conflict rather than just initial deterrence of aggression.101  
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Hence, even though President Obama on the occasion of his press conference with Abe 
during his state visit to Japan in April 2014 reiterated that Article 5 of the security treaty 
extended to include the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as under Japanese administration, thus 
becoming the first U.S. president to state this position publicly, he simultaneously 
tempered this with the statement that the U.S. was offering no new security pledges to 
Japan, that it was important as well for the U.S. to maintain good relations with China, 
and that the U.S. looked to Japan and China to reach a diplomatic resolution to territorial 
issues. Moreover, in response to a reporter’s question immediately following 
concerning the credibility of U.S. security guarantees to Japan when set against the 
background of U.S. inability to prevent Russia’s effective territorial annexation of the 
Ukraine, Obama noted that there should be no automatic expectation for the U.S. to 
intervene militarily in such disputes and it instead preferred to utilize diplomatic 
approaches.102 Japanese policy-makers whilst thus drawing some reassurance from the 
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Japan Shifts from Hedging to Incipient Balancing 
Japan’s eroding confidence in the benign intentions of China and the offense-defense 
capabilities balance now approximates very much to the logic and conditions contained 
within Defensive Realism and Liberalism that would explain states’ potential shift from 
hedging and toward more assertive balancing in international strategy. The evidence 
from Japan’s recent international behavior validates this logic as it has indeed moved 
toward “soft” and incipient “hard” balancing vis-à-vis China.  
 
“Soft” Containment and Balancing 
Japanese “soft balancing” with regard to China can be seen in newly vigorous 
campaigns of diplomacy that seek to complicate and where possible check growing 
Chinese influence in East Asia and other regions. Under the leadership of the 
Revisionists, Japan has attempted to augment its international reputation, often in 
deliberate contradistinction to China, so as to hinder its rival’s potential hegemonic rise. 
Abe and Asō in their various periods in office have sought to articulate a new “values-
oriented diplomacy”, stressing Japan’s internationalism and promotion of democracy, 
liberal market economy, human rights and rule of law, in implicit contrast to the 
authoritarianism of China. Abe during his first administration enunciated the concept 
of the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” stretching from Northeast Asia through 
Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Central Europe and the Baltic states, and 
given alleged cohesion by the promotion of “universal values” among these states.103 
In his campaign to recover the LDP leadership and premiership in 2012, Abe then 
switched to a similar concept of a “Democratic Security Diamond”, including Japan, 
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the U.S., Australia and India, and again set up in apparent opposition to China’s refusal 
to abide by international conventions and norms in its behavior.104  
 
Abe in his latest stint in office has backed up these types of values-oriented concepts 
with diplomatic visits to states on the periphery of China, many of which share some 
common cause with Japan in their anxiety over China’s rise and its territorial intentions, 
By the end of his first year in office, Abe had visited all ten of the ASEAN states. Abe’s 
visit to Myanmar in May 2013 was the first by a Japanese prime minister for thirty-six 
years to this strategically important country previously closer to China in diplomatic 
orientation, and Japan and Myanmar have pledged enhanced security dialogue and 
defense exchanges. In all these visits, Abe again asserted a series of shared values and 
hopes for enhanced cooperation that were set up in implicit opposition to China’s rising 
presence in the region. Abe has reinforced security cooperation with economic 
assistance: Japan pledging close to US$20 billion in ODA to ASEAN states at the 
Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in Tokyo in December 2013. In addition, to 
counter China’s AIIB proposal, Abe announced in May 2015 U.S.$110 billion in aid 
for Asian infrastructure project via the ADB and the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation, with the disbursement of this aid made quicker with a one-year instead of 
three-year turnaround on decision-making.105  
 
Japanese leaders have sought, in particular, to join with ASEAN states in emphasizing 
the importance of international norms and laws covering the freedom of maritime 
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navigation and handling of territorial disputes in the South China Sea and beyond.106 
Japan has supported ASEAN states bilaterally and collectively in calling for all states 
to adhere to UNCLOS and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea, so attempting to create a unified legal front to counter China’s so-called campaign 
of “law-fare” in the region and to attempt to isolate it over the ADIZ declaration. Japan 
has agreed to further develop “strategic partnerships” with Vietnam, Thailand and 
Indonesia and to strengthen dialogue on security issues. Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and 
The Philippines have focused especially on maritime security cooperation in the South 
China Sea, with Japan agreeing to provide ten patrol boats to the Philippines coast guard 
and to survey their provision to Vietnam.107  
 
Japan demonstrated its potential maritime presence in the South China Sea with its 
dispatch of over 1,000 JSDF personnel and three MSDF vessels for relief operations 
around the Leyte Gulf following the Haiyan cyclone disaster in the Philippines in 2013. 
President Benigno Aquino on visiting Japan in June 2015 also claimed his government 
would initiate talks with Japan on a Visiting Forces Agreement to allow the JSDF to 
use bases in the Philippines.108 In November 2015, during the U.S.-Japan summit at the 
Philippines APEC, Abe expressed support for U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) 
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operations and even mused that as the South China Sea, “influenced Japan’s own 
security continued attention would be devoted to it and investigation of JSDF 
activities”, so hinting that Japan could join FON in line with interpretations of collective 
self-defense.109   
 
Japan in recent years has furthermore pursued a new round of resource and energy 
diplomacy to counter China’s rising influence in these areas, and especially to obviate 
its dependency on the rare earth supplies that China threatened to embargo in 2010. 
Abe remarked in 2012 that, “India’s government has shown its political savvy by 
forging an agreement to provide Japan with rare earth materials—a vital component in 
many manufacturing processes—after China chose to use its supplies of rare earths as 
a diplomatic stick”.110  Japan has attempted to reengage with the resource-rich Central 
Asian republics often thought to form China’s “backyard” through the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization process. Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō’s 1988 Silk 
Road Action Plan first led to Japan becoming the largest ODA donor to the region. 
Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yuriko made the first visit by a high-ranking Japanese 
minister to Central Asia in 2004; Koizumi then visited the region in 2006, and METI 
minister Amari Akira in April 2007. Abe visited Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan in October 2015, becoming the first Japanese prime 
minister to visit all five central Asian republics, pledging close to ¥26 billion in grants 
and loans for state-building and democracy consolidation, and for developing gas and 
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nuclear energy in the region. Abe’s visits to Mongolia in 2013 and 2015 were similarly 
aimed to improve resource supplies for Japan. Overall, Japan in recent years has been 
attempting to demonstrate a presence in Central Asia that means China cannot 
monopolize the region through its own Silk Road plans.  
 
In the Middle East, Japan has looked to counter China’s potential hold on energy 
resources through forging closer bilateral ties. Abe paid a visit to Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar and Egypt in April 2007: the first by a 
Japanese premier to Saudi Arabia for four years, the first to the UAE and Qatar for 
twenty nine years, and the first ever to Kuwait. Abe sought to gain promises from these 
states of continued stability in oil and gas supplies. In addition, since 2006 Japan has 
launched Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations with the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). Abe after returning to power paid visits to all the GCC 
states in just over one year (Saudi Arabia and the UAE in May, Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Qatar in August 2013, and to Oman in January 2014), again looking for economic and 
energy cooperation deals.  
 
Meanwhile, China’s growing influence in Africa has led to a corresponding resurgence 
of Japanese interest. Japan has pledged since 2008 a doubling by 2012 of ODA to 
African states via the Tokyo International Conference on African Development 
(TICAD) process. Japan has reinvigorated TICAD as a counter to the China-Africa 
Summit and has elaborated a concept of development that provides a supposed middle 
way between the West’s emphasis on economic conditionality and governance reform 
and China’s authoritarianism and mercantilist search for resources. Abe paid visits to 
Cote d’Ivoire, Mozambique, and Ethiopia in January 2014, the first by a Japanese prime 
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minister to Africa since 2006, and to a select group of states with potential energy 
resources and considerable political influence on the African continent. In addition, 
since 2012 the JSDF has maintained a small peacekeeping operation (PKO) 
commitment in South Sudan, which it may look to increase in size and scope following 
the passage of the 2015 new security legislation, and in part to attempt a Japanese 
presence to match China’s burgeoning PKO role and influence in this resource-rich new 
state.   
 
Finally, Japan has sought to counter China’s rising influence across the East Asia region 
through its support for the U.S.’s leadership of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
agreement, in large part in opposition to China’s perceived favored project of regional 
integration in the shape of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
that excludes the U.S.. Japanese leaders see benefit in TPP as helping to create a U.S. 
and Japanese-oriented set of economic rules that reinforce liberal values among the 
regional participants. Abe in his address to a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress in April 
2015 remarked in regarding the TPP that, “Involving countries in Asia-Pacific whose 
backgrounds vary, the U.S. and Japan must take the lead. We must take the lead to build 
a market that is fair, dynamic, sustainable, and is also free from the arbitrary intentions 
of any nation,” and so referred to the need to counter China via the TPP without 
explicitly naming it.111  
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Japan’s “soft-balancing” of China—often dubbed an “encirclement” or “siege” strategy 
by the Japanese media—has achieved some benefits in impeding Chinese influence, 
but the pay-offs have been limited.112 Japanese “values-oriented” diplomacy has often 
failed to convince or gain much influence given Japan’s own history of colonial 
expansion and its tendency in the past for tolerating authoritarian regimes in the name 
of economic development. Prime Minister Fukuda quietly dropped the concept of the 
Arc of Freedom and Prosperity after succeeding Abe, and the DPJ proved reluctant to 
play on the concept of values-oriented diplomacy. The maritime ASEAN states are 
clearly receptive to Japanese engagement on the South China Sea, but they remain wary 
of alienating China and have no intention to become pawns in a wider Japan-China 
power struggle in the region. For instance, it was notable that in the Joint Statement of 
the Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit there was no explicit condemnation of 
China’s ADIZ; and at the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting in November 2015 the 
ASEAN representatives, facing contending pressures from Japan and the U.S. on one 
side and China on the other, failed to produce stressing concerns about China’s 
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Japan’s Hard Military Balancing and a Sino-Japanese Arms Race? 
Japan’s sense that its attempts at “soft containment” have only limited traction on 
slowing the rise of the Chinese juggernaut has thus meant that it has had to consider 
more robust “hard balancing” options both internally and externally. Japanese 
Revisionists’ initiation of various processes to clear the decks domestically for the 
exercise of military power is one indication of a new potential for balancing behavior.  
 
Japan under Abe introduced for the first time in 2013 an NSS and National Security 
Council to facilitate faster decision-making amongst key leaders and a more effective 
military crisis management. In turn, Abe’s government in July 2014 issued a Cabinet 
Decision to enable Japan to breach its post-war ban on the exercise of “limited” 
collective self-defense, and thus to use armed force in the defense of another state even 
when Japan itself is not under direct attack. In September 2014, Abe’s government then 
completed the passage through the National Diet of a raft of security-related bills the 
most prominent of which are: the Law on Response to Contingencies, enabling Japan’s 
exercise of the right of collective self-defense in scenarios where an attack on another 
state in a close relationship with Japan poses a clear danger to overturning the Japanese 
people’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, where there is no other 
appropriate means to repel the attack, and where the use of force is restricted to the 
minimum necessary to repel the attack; the Law to Ensure Security in Contingencies 
Significantly Affecting Japan, replacing the 1999 Regional Contingencies Law and 
designed to boost Japanese non-combat logistical support for the U.S. and now other 
states regionally and even globally; the International Peace Support Law, removing the 
need for Japan to enact separate laws for each JSDF dispatch in order to provide 
logistical support to multinational forces; and revisions to the International Peace 
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Cooperation Law, enabling the JSDF during UN PKO to use force in pursuing certain 
duties rather than solely for the defense of JSDF personnel. 
 
The move to exercise the right of collective self-defence clearly marks a major 
development in Japan’s overturning of its post-war security course and augmenting its 
ability to respond militarily to the rise of China. The LDP and New Kōmeitō presented 
a number of scenarios for justification of the security legislation and that formed the 
subject of National Diet deliberations, and that were envisaged to enhance U.S.-Japan 
cooperation and deterrence versus North Korea and China, including: the protection of 
U.S. ships carrying Japanese nationals; defending U.S. warships under attack close to 
Japan; defending the U.S. military against ballistic missile attacks; forceful interdiction 
of shipping; and protecting critical sea lanes; and “grey zone” contingencies around 
Japan’s far flung islands.  
 
In regard to military doctrines and capabilities, there has been a similar attempt to 
upgrade Japan’s ability to implement an incipient balancing strategy driven by China’s 
rise. Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) set out the national 
doctrine and the necessary military capabilities for its achievement. The 1995 NDPG 
omitted any direct reference to China, but the revised 2004 NDPG noted China’s 
modernization of its nuclear and ballistic missile forces and increasing ambitions for 
out-of-area operations, and that Japan should “remain attentive to its future actions”.114 
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The NDPG then went on to state that the JSDF would increasingly reorient its 
capabilities to respond to scenarios such as ballistic missile attacks, invasion of Japan’s 
offshore islands, and violations of Japanese sea and air space—all indirect references 
to China’s military activities. The 2010 NDPG stepped up the rhetoric, emphasizing 
China’s rapid military modernization and development of power projection, and 
stressed that all this was a “concern for the regional and global community”—again 
Japanese oblique language for China’s growth as a significant threat.115 The revisions 
of the NDPG in 2013 under Abe reemphasized that China’s intensification of its air and 
maritime activities remained “concerns for regional and global security”.116 
 
The 2010 NDPG reacted to China’s rising threat by indicating a step change in Japanese 
defense doctrine in that it adopted a new concept of a new Dynamic Defense Force 
(DDF), characterized by lighter and more technologically advanced forces with power 
projection capabilities for defending Japan’s periphery in regional contingencies rather 
than the static defense of just Japan itself, and so geared to respond to China’s security 
challenge. In addition, the 2010 NDPG continued the trend of Japan moving its key 
military assets southwards for the defense of its islands from China’s growing maritime 
power, including the doubling of F-15J squadrons at Naha in Okinawa.  The revisions 
                                                        
Kakawaru Bōei Keikaku no Taikō ni Tsuite’, Tokyo (National Defense Program Guidelines 2005 Fiscal 
Year), December 10, 2004, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2005/taikou.html. 
115 ‘Heisei 23 nendo ikō ni kakawaru Bōei Keikaku no Taikō ni Tsuite’ (National Defense Program 
Guidelines 2011 Fiscal Year), Tokyo, December 17, 2011, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2011/taikou.html.  
116  ‘National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond’, Tokyo, December 17, 2014, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e.pdf, p. 2. 
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to the NDPG in 2013 modified the DDF to produce the concept of a Dynamic Joint 
Defense Force (DJDF), this time emphasizing the need for improved joint operations 
of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF.  
 
In terms of the development of specific military capabilities, the 2010 and 2013 NDPGs 
and their accompanying Midterm Defense Program (MTDP) have largely sought to 
counter China’s modernization with a symmetrical build-up of JSDF assets. The 2013 
NDPG was highly notable in designating that the GSDF would for the first time acquire 
a full amphibious capability for the retaking of remote islands. The force will consist 
of around 3,000 personnel, equipped with the GSDF’s first amphibious armed 
personnel carriers reaching fifty-two in number, and Japan will further procure 
seventeen MV-22 Osprey transports as used by the USMC.  
 
The ASDF has sought to slow any adverse movement in the balance of air defense 
power by investing in fifth-generation fighters to trump China’s fourth-generation 
inventory. Japan in December 2011 thus plumped for the procurement of forty-two F-
35As. Japan’s attachment of importance to the stealth capabilities of the F-35A and its 
greater associated strengths as an air defense penetration fighter, rather than air 
superiority fighter, suggests a future interest in developing an offensive counter-air 
(OCA) doctrine for the ASDF. This type of Japanese capability might be used to strike 
against the Chinese mainland and missile launch sites in a contingency and so mark a 
radical departure in Japan’s defense-oriented posture. The ASDF is furthermore now 
set on the path to procure Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to help 
patrol Japan’s air space, long coastline and distant islands.  
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Japan’s reaction to China’s missile forces has again been largely symmetric in 
attempting to neutralize these capabilities through the deployment of BMD. The 2010 
and 2013 NDPGs mandate the ASDF to maintain six anti-aircraft groups equipped with 
PAC-3 batteries, and the MSDF eight Aegis destroyers equipped with BMD SM-3 
interceptors. The JSDF now deploys after the U.S. the most sophisticated BMD 
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific, thus attempting deterrence by denial of China’s ballistic 
missile threat, backed up by the F-15J and then the F-35A in the future for countering 
cruise missiles.117  
 
Matching Japan’s recent primary concerns over China relating to maritime security, it 
is the MSDF which has embarked on the most significant build-up of capabilities under 
the 2010 and previous NDPGs, many of which are designed to negate both the PLAN’s 
access-denial and blue water naval strategies. The MSDF under the 2010 NDPG and 
MTDP was provided an increase in its submarine fleet by more than one third from 
fifteen to twenty-two boats, including the introduction of the Sōryū-class submarine 
platform that provides leading-edge technologies in air-independent and fuel-cell 
propulsion and operation. The destroyer force in the 2010 NDPG and MTDP was to be 
maintained at forty-eight in number, but was subsequently increased in the 2013 NDPG 
and MTDP to fifty-four in number. Japan as part of this maritime build-up continues to 
introduce Destroyer-Helicopter warships (DDH). The MSDF has taken delivery of two 
7,000 ton Hyūga-class 16DDHs, with a regular complement of four helicopters but 
capable of carrying up to eleven; and has now procured a further two 19,000 ton Izumo-
class 22DDs, capable of carrying up to fourteen helicopters, launched in August 2013 
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and August 2015. MSDF DDHs are the largest vessels built for the service in the post-
war period and are in all but name light helicopter carriers. The prime function of these 
assets is to provide a very powerful anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability, clearly 
aimed against China’s access-denial strategy. But Japan’s venturing back into carrier 
technology is resonate of a possible Sino-Japanese carrier arms race, and the suspicion 
of analysts is that the MSDF might eventually attempt to operate fixed-wing aircraft 
from the DDH-22s, such as the maritime variant of the F-35. Japan’s maritime air and 
ASW capability is to be further strengthened through the procurement of a replacement 
for its P-3Cs with the introduction of an indigenously developed P-1 patrol surveillance 
aircraft able to sweep over an 8,000 kilometer range and thus deep into the South China 
Sea. 
 
Japan under Abe also appears resolved to more fully fund Japan’s build-up of national 
military capabilities. Shortly after taking power, Abe initiated the first, if modest, rise 
in Japanese defense spending in over a decade. The JMOD’s defense expenditure has 
increased at rates of one to two percent over the last three years, and it has requested 
another 2.2 per cent rise for 2015-16 that would mark the largest defense budget in the 
post-war period.118  Japanese policy-makers have argued these increases in defense 
budget are still modest when viewed in the context of stagnating budgets for close to 
two decades and the rapid rise in China’s military expenditure. But the desire for Japan 
to raise defense spending is clearly driven by a growing impulse to balance China 
militarily (Chart 3). 
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U.S.-Japan Alliance and other Partners for Balancing 
Japan’s military modernization program has certainly enhanced its ability to internally 
balance China, but at the same time it has redoubled its efforts to strengthen external 
balancing alongside the U.S. and to obviate any risks of abandonment. Although U.S.-
Japan alliance relations under the DPJ initially suffered some tensions with the 
Hatoyama administration’s decision to withdraw the MSDF from refueling operations 
to support the international coalition’s efforts in Afghanistan, and its reconsideration of 
and then relenting on plans for the relocation of the USMC Futenma Air Station within 
Okinawa Prefecture, in fact the DPJ continued to strengthen the long-term military 
foundations of the alliance.  
 
In regard to BMD, perhaps the most important long-term driver of U.S.-Japan military 
integration, cooperation under the DPJ rolled forward. Japan and the U.S. continued 
with the joint development of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor missile, and agreed in 























Chart 3: Japan Defense Expenditure Trends 1997-2015 
and Defense Budget Request for 2016
Source: Ministry of Defense Japan
 72 
of the missile to third countries.119 In April 2012, Japan and the US completed plans for 
collocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command with that of the USAF at Yokota air 
base, near Tokyo, so as to improve information sharing in response to missile attacks.120   
 
The 2010 NDPG was devised with close linkages to the U.S.’s own Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) that year, and coincided in general with the U.S.’s “rebalance” 
toward the Asia-Pacific announced in January 2011. The DPJ actually overtook 
previous LDP administrations by updating in the 2011 Security Consultative 
Committee (the main policy coordinating mechanism of the alliance) the 2005 and 2007 
“Common Strategic Objectives” of the bilateral alliance to include functions such as 
enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), maritime security, and 
cyber security, and so laying the groundwork for the later revision of the U.S.-Japan 
Guidelines for Defense Cooperation under the Abe administration in 2015.121 U.S.-
Japan alliance interoperability was then tested and strengthened in the wake of the 3.11 
disasters. 122  The U.S. launched Operation Tomodachi to support the JSDF’s own 
mobilization of 100,000 troops for disaster relief by utilizing the full panoply of its 
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military assets in Japan itself and the Pacific, including twenty USN vessels, 140 
aircraft, and 20,000 USMC personnel. 
 
The return of the LDP to power in 2012 has opened the way for further initiatives to 
strengthen the US-Japan alliance. The Abe administration’s revised 2013 NDPG was 
clearly geared to strengthening security cooperation with the U.S. The next stage in 
reinforcing the alliance has been the April 2015 revision of the U.S.-Japan Defense 
Guidelines in April 2015, the first such revision since 1997. The 2015 Defense 
Guidelines revisions expand the range of Japanese support for the U.S. in contingencies 
to include: ISR; BMD; maritime security; asset protection; joint use of facilities; PKO; 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and defense activities in cyber space and 
outer space. The revised Guidelines stress a concept of “seamless cooperation” and a 
“whole of government approach”, removing the previous rigid separation of bilateral 
cooperation into “peacetime”, “Japan” and “regional” contingencies. The intention is 
that military cooperation will operate more smoothly across all potential scenarios and 
levels of conflict escalation.  
 
Moreover, the revised Defense Guidelines emphasize that bilateral cooperation should 
now be global, and not necessarily be restricted geographically, as in past formulations, 
to Japan itself or the surrounding region. Even more significantly, and designed to 
interlink with Japan’s breach of the ban on the exercise of collective self-defense in 
July 2014, the revised Defense Guidelines outline the areas where the JSDF can now 
exercisze force to defend U.S. forces, such as the protection of U.S. shipping, 
interdiction of other shipping, BMD, and providing logistical support during 
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conflicts.123 Japan has then followed up the revised Defense Guidelines with its new 
security legislation in the same year to create the framework for the exercise of 
collective self-defense, comprising the Law on Response to Contingencies and the Law 
to Ensure Security in Contingencies Significantly Affecting Japan, replacing the 1999 
Regional Contingencies Law. 
 
In addition, Japan has expanded the scope of its military cooperation, in conjunction 
with U.S. regional security strategy, to begin to incorporate a wider range of U.S. allies 
and partners to support its incipient balancing strategy. Japan and Australia security ties 
have advanced relatively steadily since the “Joint Declaration on Security” in 2003, and 
the DPJ administration concluded an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement 
(ACSA) with Australia in 2010 for the sharing of military logistical support in 
peacetime and UN operations. Modeled on Japan’s ACSA with the U.S. signed in 1996 
and revised in 1999, it clearly provides a template compatible for possible trilateral 
logistical cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and Australia in the future. Japan and 
Australia signed an Information Security Agreement in May 2012, again modeled on 
that between Japan and the U.S. and thus serving to further enhance potential for 
trilateral cooperation; and in April 2014 both sides concluded a new EPA and pledged 
further cooperation on cyber-security and defense technology exchanges.124 The NSC 
in April 2015, in line with the new Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense 
Technology and Equipment, approved Japan’s participation in the competitive tender 
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to provide new submarines for Australia. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki 
Shipbuilding Ltd. are seeking to export technology from its Sōryū-class attack 
submarines.    
 
In comparison with Australia, Japanese security ties with India have proceeded more 
slowly since the initial “Joint Declaration on Security and Cooperation” in 2008. The 
DPJ administration did, though, step up cooperation with this emerging U.S. partner: 
conducting the first ever foreign ministry director-level security talks trilaterally with 
the U.S. and India in December 2011, and reaching an agreement to hold joint naval 
maritime security exercises in 2012. Similarly, Japan and the DPJ government have 
been more willing to explore meaningful ties with South Korea as another important 
U.S. partner. MSDF officers for the first time observed U.S.-South Korea military 
exercises in July 2010 as a demonstration of trilateral unity in the wake of the Cheonan 
sinking incident. South Korea Navy officers then participated as observers for the first 
time in U.S.-Japan large-scale military exercises in December, this time following 
North Korea’s bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. Japan and South Korea since early 
2011 have been considering and in April 2012 were reportedly close to signing an 
ACSA and General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) for the 
exchange of BMD early warning intelligence. In May 2012 the South Korean 
government shied away from finally concluding the agreements due to domestic 
political sensitivities over military cooperation with Japan, further compounded by 
Abe’s visit to Yasukuni in December 2013; but following North Korea’s nuclear and 
missile tests in February 2016, Japan and South have resumed discussions of 
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implementing the agreement.125  Meanwhile, Japan under the first and second Abe 
administrations has shown interest in establishing cooperation with NATO, and signed 
defense cooperation memoranda with the UK and France in 2012 and 2013 for 
cooperation on defense production and intelligence sharing.  
 
Conclusion: Japan’s Own Uncertain Strategic Intentions and “Resentful Realism” 
Japan can now be observed as shifting from its past hedging strategy vis-à-vis China 
toward a strategy that is starting to resemble active soft and incipient hard balancing. 
The key conditions that in the past ensured Japan could maintain a hedging strategy 
have begun to deteriorate over the last decade, so initiating this shift. Japanese policy-
makers’ previous belief in their ability to read China’s intentions as benign has 
increasingly deserted them, as has their confidence in the potential malleability of 
Chinese intentions through political and economic engagement. Japan’s own domestic 
regime change, characterized by the rise of Revisionism and discontent with the status 
quo, has only reinforced the impulse to avoid “underbalancing”. Indeed, the rising 
domestic consensus in Japan is that China’s intentions, if readable at all, are now 
fundamentally malign toward Japan. Most strikingly, Japanese policy-makers no longer 
trust that the balance of offense-defense capabilities is in their favor, either internally 
or externally. China’s military modernization is perceived as set to overwhelm the 
JSDF’s own defensive capabilities and to be weakening the U.S.’s ability to police the 
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global commons and to restrain China’s encroachment of core Japanese security 
interests.  
 
The overall consequence has indeed been Japan shifting, if incrementally and certainly 
not letting go entirely of hedging, toward more incipient balancing behavior. Much of 
this balancing is “soft” in orientation, with efforts to check Chinese influence through 
strengthening partnerships with other East Asian states around China’s periphery 
equally concerned at the negative externalities of its rise. But there is also a component 
of seeking to balance China globally through vigorous diplomatic activity and resource 
deals in Africa and the Middle East.  
 
Meanwhile, Japan’s hard balancing has taken the form of the emergence of an emphasis 
on building up the JSDF defensive capabilities primarily, but also with the beginnings 
of considering the selective procurement of power projection capabilities that could be 
turned to collective self-defense and even offensive purposes. Japan has thus found 
itself in a quiet arms race with China in East Asia evocative of “normal” balancing 
behavior on a par with that of other states facing a similar external security 
environment. Alongside these internal efforts, Japan has, of course, redoubled its 
support for the U.S.-Japan alliance in order to buttress the U.S.’s potential for balancing 
against China.  
 
Japan’s identification as an incipient balancer presents a range of important conclusions 
to the questions posed at the start of this paper. First, the discussion in this paper and 
the recent evidence from Japan’s behavior is cause for greater reexamination of the 
quaint consensus amongst Neorealism, Liberalism and Constructivism on the 
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immobility of Japanese security policy. The very conditions contained with those 
perspectives, and especially the former two, regarding a state’s potential disposition 
toward hedging, now demand serious review in the case of Japan. This is not to say that 
these perspectives are fundamentally flawed, but rather that the conclusions and 
orthodoxy they give rise to are now outmoded because they have not taken sufficient 
account of new evidence. If this is given proper consideration, then these perspectives 
have ample ability to point to and explain Japan’s initiation of balancing behavior. 
These perspectives, hence, need to abandon the comfort zone of their past orthodoxy 
and look again at the dynamism of Japan’s security policy if they are to retain their full 
explanatory utility in regard to Japan now and in the future. In particular, Neorealism 
can afford to be bolder in asserting its perspective on Japan’s remilitarization of security 
policy rather than readily ceding ground to the dominance of Constructivism and 
Liberalism.  
 
Second, and even more importantly, Japan’s inching toward active balancing of China 
has very significant implications for East Asian security, although these are not yet 
entirely clear given the nature of the process of Japan’s shift. Japan’s move toward 
balancing is certainly not yet complete, irreversible, or fully revealed and embedded in 
national grand strategy. As outlined earlier, the Yoshida Doctrine has proved a highly 
resilient grand strategy in the post-war period and will not be abandoned lightly. The 
result is that Japan is demonstrating, and is likely to continue to demonstrate, 
fluctuations between the Yoshida Doctrine and more active balancing behavior. In turn, 
these fluctuations will be driven by the development of the international and domestic 
determinants of Japan’s strategy as already outlined, which are themselves in a process 
of volatile change. Japan will be forced to react to variations in the benignity and 
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malignity of China’s intentions, and just as importantly Japanese behavior will be 
largely determined by the condition of the U.S.-Japan alliance and fears over 
entrapment and abandonment.  
 
Japan’s sense of being caught between a rising China and a U.S. ally that it has been so 
dependent on but with which its security interests do not always converge, will make 
for hesitancy in its security stance. Japan’s impulse may be to react strongly to 
perceived Chinese security provocations at times, but will lack assurance in U.S. 
backing for this behavior. All this will encourage Japan to act more autonomously when 
necessary. Hence, not only China, but also the U.S., may find Japan a difficult security 
partner to deal with.  
 
Japanese unpredictability is and will be enhanced by the continuing changes to its 
domestic regime. The unwinding of the post-war system is not complete, and the 
struggle between Pragmatists and Revisionists will continue, although with the latter 
likely to eventually triumph. Japanese dalliance with Revisionism, and the feeling of 
ideological antagonism it engenders toward China, and even toward the U.S. at times, 
in the desire to cast off post-war constraints and restore national standing, makes for a 
Japanese international strategy capable of being highly confrontational.  
 
If an uncertain international security environment is combined with domestic 
Revisionism, then Japan can be seen a lacking confidence in the basic foundations of 
its security and to experience a something of a sense of paranoia. The outcome is that 
as Japan is pushed toward a new “realism” in its international strategy it will not always 
be the kind of cautious “Reluctant Realism” seeking comfortable alliance with the U.S. 
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and contributing, as U.S. policy-makers would hope, to a stable balance of power in the 
Asia-Pacific. But rather at times a type of “Resentful Realism”, driven by fear of China, 
lack of trust in the U.S., and a desire for a reassertion of national pride and autonomy, 
may take root in Japan. This type of “Resentful Realism” may generate impulses for 
more independent national military action by Japan, facilitated by new autonomous 
capabilities, and will clearly be a difficult quantity for the U.S. to handle, let alone 
China. In this type of scenario, Japan’s experimentation with active balancing, may not 
restore equilibrium and stability in the region to match China’s rise but actually become 
a source of unpredictability and instability.  
 
If this is thought to be a possible outcome of Japan’s shift from hedging to incipient 
balancing, then a third conclusion becomes apparent. Japan’s impact on regional 
stability can be mitigated most obviously by China’s moderation of its security policy 
so as not to cross the Japanese key redlines of territory and SLOC security. The U.S. 
needs to reassure Japan that it will not be “passed” and its security interests overlooked 
in any possible strategic accommodation with China. For Japan itself, the lesson is that 
as it reconsiders the Yoshida Doctrine and Revisionism takes hold, that it must consider 
just how this process of international strategic and domestic regime change impacts on 
the very same problem that it has in dealing with China: states’ surety in the reading of 
the international intentions of others. Japan’s policy-makers thus need to make sure that 
they are not trapped in the same problem of being unable to signal their intentions and 
maintaining a sense of benignity that they accuse their Chinese counterparts of lacking. 
If they fail to do so, then Japan will be labeled a security risk on a par with China, the 
risk of a Sino-Japanese military clash may rise, and the consequences for the regional 
security order will be disastrous.   
